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Evaluation of archival sources on Japanese trade in the bakumatsu period (1853–
1867) and in the fi rst fi fteen years of the Meiji period is the primary purpose of 
this two-part essay, of which Part 1 appeared in Japan Review, 21 (2009). After 
the opening of the ports in 1859, statistics were directly compiled by bakufu 
offi  cials from traders’ invoices. Previously, offi  cials had relied on data furnished 
by wholesalers (tonya) and guilds for coastal trade. Th e notional parity of a gold 
yen and a silver yen in the closed gold standard put in place in 1871 broke 
down in the open market for the Mexican dollar, the accepted unit of account 
for foreign trade in the newly opened ports. It was only as gold disappeared and 
Japan’s currency system became de facto a silver one that a conversion emerged 
in national accounts of totals from dollars (or silver yen) into gold yen at close 
to a one-for-one rate. Arguably, Japanese offi  cials coped well in the early Meiji 
years with the challenge of creating Western style statistics, even if variant grand 
totals emerged in the conversion of dollar fi gures into gold yen in the uncertain 
monetary conditions. Archival information on coastal trade in earlier Tokugawa 
times rested on copies. Th ose copies are few and remote from the originals. 
Th is is true also for the new foreign trade of the 1860s. Even under central 
direction from 1869, only a few copies, mostly drafts rather than fi nal versions, 
are known for the new aggregates (from 1869, in gold ryō; from 1871, in gold 
yen). Th e basic dollar totals forwarded regularly from individual Custom Houses 
to the central authorities, the key raw material for converting dollar grand totals 
into gold yen until the 1880s, are known almost exclusively from fi gures in the 
British Parliamentary Papers.
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1. Learning the Art of Foreign Trade Statistics
If Japanese offi  cials in the bakumatsu years had wished to maintain their trade accounts 
in the old style without being importuned by others to change, it would have been impossible 
to do so. Coming from societies already accustomed to the collection and use of copious 
statistics, representatives of Western nations sought to document Japan in statistical terms. 
Japanese offi  cials found themselves badgered not only by consular offi  cials but also by foreign 
merchants. Th e fi rst foreign Chamber of Commerce was constituted in Nagasaki 長崎 in June 
1861, and prominent among its objectives was the aim “to compile and publish a statement of 
trade, and otherwise assist to make the resources of the country generally known.” Chambers of 
Commercewere formed in other open ports, as well, and sought information from the Japanese 
offi  cials, duplicating to some extent what Western consular offi  cials were doing. Customs 
management lacked a precise institutional identity in the early years of open ports. After the 
Dutch-Japanese treaty of 1857, the kaisho 会所, which had handled foreign trade in Nagasaki, 
at fi rst exercised this role, but lost its managerial function in controlling Western trade. 
Western diplomats from the outset referred to the Japanese offi  ce where customs matters were 
administered as the “custom house,” a usage that implied a highly specialized offi  ce manned by 
career specialists, close to the water’s edge. Th e fi rst term used in Japanese to denote “custom 
house” was unjōsho 運上所, which by decree of the Finance Ministry (Ōkurashō 大蔵省) in 
1872 (11th month) became zeikan 税関. In Nagasaki in 1863, the fromer kaisho was restyled 
unjōsho, and a decade later the designation duly became zeikan. At the outset of the Meiji 
era, the unjōsho were responsible to the Foreign Aff airs Agency, which in 1869 fi nally became 
the Foreign Ministry (Gaimushō 外務省). Foreign Ministry reporting of foreign trade was 
surrendered in 1871 to the Ministry of Finance. 
Rutherford Alcock, who arrived in Japan in 1858 as the fi rst consul general of Great 
Britain, complained in March 1860 that the want of a system, combined with the desire of 
individual merchants for secrecy, rendered it impossible for foreign representatives to get details 
of trade.1 He had noted in the preceding November that the Japanese themselves admitted that 
they lacked both a system and knowledge of how to transact business.2 Many Western consular 
offi  cials were like Alcock in having a background in China, where foreigners ran the customs 
departments in the ports, and they had little sympathy for the Japanese or understanding of 
their predicament. A passing post 1868 reference to the contrasting circumstances in Japan and 
China hints at a British lack of confi dence in statistical collection that was not managed by 
Europeans. Th is lack of confi dence was most explicit in the comments at Hyōgo/Osaka 兵庫/
大阪 by Gower, the offi  cial most hostile in those years to Japanese management. He maintained 
in 1872 that the defects in the statistics were “likely to be repeated in future unless the Japanese 
government adopt, for a few years at least, a foreign inspectorate to protect their commercial 
revenues, as well as the interests of honest merchants.”3 Th e judgments of men who had minimal 
background in Japanese aff airs at the time of their appointments tended to be unduly harsh. 
Th e British made no allowance for the fact that Japanese offi  cers were making the adjustment 
from a situation in which no taxes had been levied on the transit of goods to one in which taxes 
were collected; and from an informal statistical framework which was a passive and intermittent 
collation of data, provided by wholesalers or tonya 問屋 with little central guidance, to one in 
which these offi  cers of the bakufu were creating statistical compilations from raw returns, of 
which they were for the fi rst time the originating collectors. For the Japanese, the problem was 
in part one of imposing a new statistical discipline on offi  cials who had been trained in the old 
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school of administration. Outside Nagasaki, it was rather a case of creating functionaries with 
no previous experience of foreign trade in any fashion. In the fi rst decade of open ports, the 
accounting operation was an appendage of the offi  ce of bugyō 奉行 (magistrate), and each 
offi  ce was independent of scrutiny or direction from the center for its routine working. In the 
1860s, less than wholehearted cooperation is to be explained more by reluctance to yield to 
unwelcome and pushy foreigners than by opposition to new work routines. Th ough consuls 
quite quickly got access to the books, they were initially unsuccessful in getting access to 
statistics of total trade, whether compiled Japanese style on a monthly basis or added up at year’s 
end.
Nagasaki presented the problems more acutely than Kanagawa 神奈川. As late as 
November 1860, a British representative complained that details of trade could not be obtained 
at the Custom House “owing to the want of method, dilatoriness and procrastination of those 
offi  cials.”4 In 1859–1860, when Custom House offi  cials withheld statistical estimates from 
consular staff , foreign diplomats attempted to make sense of the actual registers of “applications” 
for permits, which Japanese offi  cials reluctantly allowed them to consult. Th e report of the 
consul at Kanagawa for the second half of the year 1859 was based on examination of such 
Custom House records, and on what he described as “books kept at this offi  ce.”5 British offi  cials 
sent clerks to the Custom House to copy out particulars from permits, or they paid a customs 
offi  cial a monthly fee to supply them with the details.6 Th ey remarked that the “applications,” a 
vital source of trade detail fi led by merchants in order to acquire the permits authorizing exports 
or imports of goods (“entries” in Western customs jargon), were readily accepted at the Custom 
House, even if carelessly fi lled in.
Given access to some details of Custom House paperwork but unable to obtain overall 
fi gures of trade, consular offi  cials balked at attempting an independent assembling of the data 
and calculation of grand totals. For Nagasaki, the crude calculations for the latter half of 1859 
were based on fi gures from Shanghai, through which most of Nagasaki’s trade was routed.7 
For 1860, the Nagasaki return was again based on fi gures of imports from Japan recorded at 
the Shanghai Custom House, plus an estimate of exports from Nagasaki to Hong Kong and 
England, which were valued at 463,760 dollars, and converted into sterling at 5s.0d. to the 
dollar.8 In early 1860, Alcock recorded his belief that the trade of the three open ports for the 
fi rst six months after opening amounted to £1 million sterling.9 Figures quoted for Kanagawa 
for the second half of 1859 in a report of 26 April 1860 were based partly on the Shanghai port 
books.10 In the course of 1860, British offi  cials at Kanagawa were still without regular access to 
Japanese Custom House counts; they recorded detail month after month, but did not express 
clear-cut totals for accounting periods, whether monthly or longer.11
Th e low opinion held by British offi  cials of the work of the Custom Houses was greatly 
colored by their access to the applications for permits to export or import. Th ey do not seem 
to have been aware that grand totals of trade were being withheld from them, and hence they 
saw things simply in terms of a lack of systems. In retrospect, we might judge that the details 
of their registers could be faulted, but Japanese Custom House offi  cials in the fi rst years of 
open ports probably executed their work more fully and more rapidly than frustrated British 
representatives ever realized.12
Only the faintest traces of the early work of Custom House offi  cials now exist. Th e 
only thorough study of the pre 1868 sources is that by Ishii in 1944.13 He was familiar with 
British Parliamentary Paper fi gures, and with M. B. T Paske-Smith’s published work.14 He also 
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gathered sparse Japanese data, and exercised a real critical faculty in attempting to resolve the 
contradictions in much of his data. Th e dismissive comment by Sugiyama Shinya 杉山伸也 
that “for the period 1859–67 Ishii Takashi 石井孝 has given his own estimates, but his fi gures 
seem to have been put together in a random fashion from diff erent sources which he considers 
appropriate rather than according to a coherent system” is not only unfair but inaccurate.15 
Th e comment entirely ignores the scarcity and heterogeneity of data, and the problems posed 
thereby. It is also not the view of others. Baba and Tatemoto regarded Ishii’s as the most reliable 
examination of the fi gures.16 Ishii had quite carefully worked out his fi gures, fi rst constructing 
a table for the years 1859–1867, albeit with some gaps, based on a short note published in 
1895 by Kawai Toshiyasu 河合利安.17 Kawaii’s tables are a one page communication, and do 
not warrant comment, except that his tables are an indication that BPP papers were becoming 
more widely known in Japan in the 1880s and 1890s.18 Ishii then put together a second table 
presenting fi gures compiled by Paske-Smith in the 1920s from sources that he described as 
“obtained at the Custom House by H. B. M. Consuls.” Th ese are from the archives of one 
or more British consular or diplomatic offi  ces in Japan. A third table, confi ned to Yokohama 
data for 1859–1867, was originally published under the auspices of the Yokohama Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry (Yokohama Shōgyō Kaigisho 横浜商業会議所) without any 
indication of its origins.19 To avoid any confusion, it should be noted at this point that, though 
the foreign trade was conducted almost from the outset at Yokohama, the British consulate at 
fi rst remained at Kanagawa, the original site envisaged for foreign trade. It continued moreover 
to be designated by the British as the Kanagawa consulate long after it had moved to Yokohama 
itself. 
Kawai Toshiyasu stated in his article that he drew fi gures from consular reports to the 
British Foreign Offi  ce. Not content to accept all of Kawai’s numbers, Ishii supplemented those 
with data from other sources for years in which grand totals were lacking in the BPP, and for 
years in which there were variants for ports. Th e BPP fi gures were themselves becoming known 
in Japan by the 1880s. Serial data for all three open ports for the years 1860–1867, with a few 
gaps, were printed in the fourth issue of Kokka gakkai zasshi 國家學會雜誌 (15 June 1887), 
and although no source was identifi ed, the data were quite clearly drawn from British consular 
reports.20 In transcription, errors inevitably slipped in. Th ere are three defi ciencies or errors in 
Kokka gakkai zasshi data, two for 1863 and one for 1865. Paske-Smith himself made a mistake 
for 1865, giving a slightly rounded fi gure of 1,560,800 dollars when, in fact, the number 
should read 560,788.21 Th e points we should not miss are these: Ishii’s fi gures vary on occasion 
from fi gures in Kawai, BPP, and Paske-Smith, and some of the fi gures of Paske-Smith diff er 
from those in the BPP.22 Th e most disconcerting challenge facing Ishii, perhaps, was that the 
BPP give a range of fi gures, not a single fi gure, for Yokohama in the year 1863. He opted for the 
high totals of 10,554,012 dollars for exports, twice the amount of a variant fi gure in BPP and of 
the fi gure given by Paske-Smith.23 He also opted for 3,244,584 dollars for imports, disregarding 
without discussion a higher fi gure for imports of 3,474,749 dollars that appeared in Table 3 of 
his own volume.24 He left aside the very high exports total of 13,749,985 dollars that Kawai had 
off ered; how that total was arrived at is unknown. However, it is likely that there was an error 
of transcription in which a “1” was erroneously inserted in front of a fi gure of 3,749,985 (fairly 
close to 3,704,484, the fi gure in Ishii’s Table 3), thus infl ating the total to 13,749,985. Th e 
results of Ishii’s work in his Table 5 are the best available for the subject.25 With the exception 
of the year 1863, export fi gures from 1862 onwards tend to accord in all sources, and not just 
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in Paske-Smith. Th e real divergence is in imports. Th ere are marked diff erences in the fi gures 
for Nagasaki and Yokohama in the table in the modern Yokohama shi shi 横浜市史.26 Imports 
to Yokohama in 1860–1862 as recorded in Yokohama kaikō 50 nen shi 横浜開港五十年史 are 
even higher.27
Th e timing of consular access to grand totals of trade can be dated roughly for Kanagawa. 
In or before March 1861, Consul Howard Vyse had access to “declared” fi gures for 1860 (that 
is, the values declared at the Custom House and entered in its statistical record).28 In Nagasaki, 
the problem of access lingered on. Th ough fi gures for 1860 and 1861 later became known 
to the offi  cials there, the absence of fi gures for 1861 suggests that a breakthrough in offi  cial 
communications did not occur until 1863. Finally, the BPP report for the year 1862 gives 
Nagasaki numbers denominated in taels, a money of account used by offi  cials in Nagasaki. 
According to the BPP report, the fi gures were of Japanese origin and they had come quickly 
into the hands of consular offi  cials.29 Alcock showed in his book, Th e Capital of the Tycoon: a 
Narrative of Th ree Years Residence in Japan published in 1863, how things had improved. With 
fi gures in his possession either when he left Japan in March 1862 or coming into his hand 
afterwards, he was able to give fi gures for Nagasaki in 1861 “according to the returns made up 
on the spot” (i.e., from the Custom House) and for Yokohama in 1860 and 1861.30 
For 1859, Ishii used what he identifi ed very baldly as bugyōsho records (bugyōsho no 
kiroku 奉行所の記録) for Nagasaki,31 and he also quoted a contemporary Japanese source for 
Hakodate 箱館.32 For the years 1860 and 1861, he was able to drawn on two Japanese sources 
for Hakodate.33 For 1863, he quoted an export fi gure of 5,116,634 dollars for Yokohama from 
a Japanese source, slightly less than the better known BPP fi gure of 5,134,185 dollars.34 Th e fact 
that Japanese totals were becoming accessible in the early 1860s is also suggested by the evidence 
which Paske-Smith cited six decades later. Drawing on what appear to be older consular sources 
in Japan, he was able to give rounded fi gures for Nagasaki in 1859 and 1860, and for Yokohama 
in 1860. It seems probable that these fi gures came into consular possession as British relations 
with the Custom Houses improved, although too late to feature in reports fi led by Alcock and 
his contemporaries in the early 1860s.35 
Th e regularizing of information sharing by Custom Houses with consulates can be traced 
easily enough. Whatever the vagaries of access in the case of Nagasaki fi gures for 1859–1861, 
fi gures for 1862 were received and reported promptly. Th e consul’s problems in converting the 
1862 totals from taels and the fact that fi gures for 1862 are missing from Paske-Smith’s source 
hint, however, at the confused situation of the time. Th is obviously continued the following 
year, as the report for 1863 was submitted only on 3 January 1865, and in response to a formal 
request from the legation in Edo. Th e tenor of the report implies that the data were already in 
the consulate. A consul, who was new to Nagasaki, commented that he was not “able to form a 
correct idea of the real value of trade during that year [1863], which the enclosed returns only 
represent in part,” giving the impression that he had failed to take any action on the return 
which was already in the offi  ce.36 In contrast to the situation in Nagasaki, information for 
Kanagawa (Yokohama) was provided in a timely manner. Th e consular report of 31 January 
1863 gave fi gures for 1862 and retrospectively quoted the data for both 1860 and 1861, 
showing how the communication of statistical totals from Custom House to consular station 
had been established on a fi rm basis at Kanagawa.37 Prompt provision of data to the British was 
repeated a year later for the 1863 fi gures.38 
In Nagasaki, it looks as if the problems resided wholly or in part in the consulate. Th e 
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confusion over currency and the incomplete coverage of the data in the return for 1862 and 
the fact that the report for 1863 was not received in Edo until 1865 suggest as much.39 Th e 
transition to regular reporting was achieved in Nagasaki only in January 1865 when the 1864 
report was conveyed to British offi  cials. By contrast, the change for the better was signaled in 
Yokohama from the time of the report for 1862.
Hakodate reports began to become regular from the time of return of data for 1864. 
While a return for 1861 for Hakodate appears in BPP early in 1862, the return for the port 
for the year 1862 is simply a list of imports and exports without a grand total.40 Later, the 
report of 19 February 1864, which provided the 1863 fi gures, also added up the export fi gures 
for 1862.41 Finally, the 1863 fi gures in their prompt receipt (on 1 January 1864!) which were 
followed later by punctual data for 1864 and 1865 set the pattern of future smooth statistical 
reporting.42 Consular contact was primarily with the Custom House offi  cials. It is less clear 
how much offi  cials had to call on the bugyō in person for intervention in the early years. Bugyō 
goodwill was certainly forthcoming after mid decade. Th is can be seen in the trouble taken 
by the bugyō of Osaka, not yet a port, to provide up to date population census fi gures and 
also remarkable details of the port’s coastal trade for 1866 (See Appendix 2). Th ese 1866 data, 
the sole data for several decades on the port’s general import trade, seem to contradict the 
widespread assumption of a bakumatsu breakdown in bureaucratic standards.43 Th ey also serve 
to underline that, while Western style statistics demanded an entirely new approach, there 
existed enough of a working statistical awareness to facilitate a response to new challenges.
From the time of receipt of the Nagasaki data for 1864, aggregated totals for all the ports 
could be compiled. Th ey were incorporated into the fi rst general British consular survey of 
trade, for the year 1869, which appeared in a report dated 1 March 1870.44 In Nagasaki, returns 
in taels were the norm in the early 1860s and returns in ichibus in the mid 1860s, but thereafter 
returns for all three open ports were in dollars. Even after 1873, when good offi  cial Japanese 
reports began to appear, British reports continued to be based primarily on the returns to 
the legation from individual consular stations. Th e reason for this was essentially the hybrid 
nature of Japanese currency. Th e Japanese central returns of trade converted dollars into gold 
yen, in keeping with the bookkeeping requirements of the nominal national yen gold standard 
of 1871. However, as the dollar remained the accepted unit of account of the ports (apart 
from a few early years in Nagasaki), the British returns were simply observing the commercial 
reality for Japanese offi  cials; the dollar was the currency in which the accounts given by the 
Custom Houses to consular offi  cers were denominated. Although a majority of transactions 
was conducted in local currencies, the aggregation of taxes and of gross totals of trade was 
presented in dollars alone. Before 1868, no national trade totals (that is, aggregation of all 
returns from the ports) contemporary with the year of account exist; this suggests that gross 
national aggregation came into existence only with the emergence in 1869 of the ryō and, later, 
the gold yen.
A characteristic of the 1860s is the existence of variant fi gures. Variants in BPP fi gures 
for Hakodate in several early years or in the BPP fi gures for Nagasaki for 1864 can be regarded 
as refl ections of imperfections or confusion in the early stages of regular reporting, but it is 
harder to explain why they exist also in some of the fi gures of the second half of the 1860s.45 
A few of these variations are of substantial proportions. Export fi gures in Paske-Smith and 
Yokohama shi shi are identical for 1866 at 14,100,000 dollars, but they give diff erent import 
fi gures: 11,430,000 in Paske-Smith and 11,735,000 in Yokohama shi shi.46 For 1867, exports 
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and imports in BPP are larger than fi gures in both Yokohama shi shi and Paske-Smith.47 In both 
pre and post Restoration sources, diff erent gross totals may refl ect one or more of several facts: 
they may have been drawn from incomplete original, or intermediate, workings of fi gures; they 
may or may not include bullion movements or coastal trade to or from open ports; and errors 
of transcription may have occurred. Th e preface to the fi rst modern monthly reports in 1873 
noted that the details of earlier statistics had not been “carefully prepared.”48 Th e only sure 
fact is that variations exist; beyond that, one enters the realm of speculation. Th e published 
consular reports provide the best guide. Th ey are the sole series containing the original dollar 
denominations trade declared by the Custom Houses. Th is feature distinguishes them from 
records compiled using later offi  cial conversions from dollars into gold yen in Tokyo. It seems 
prudent to adopt the view of the Yokohama shi shi volume on early trade statistics: the fi gures in 
the BPP are to be preferred not only for the early years, but for the entire period up to 1884.49
However, the two most substantial cases of contradiction in the early 1860s prove on closer 
examination of the sources to be superfi cial. In the Nagasaki fi gures for 1863, the problem was 
confusion in converting from taels to dollars, a confusion that had already existed for the 1862 
fi gures (see Appendix 3, A). In the case of the Yokohama fi gures for 1863, the confusion arose 
solely from a badly structured report (see Appendix 3.B). Dollar totals in the main text of the 
consular report on that year are the “declared values” at the Custom House, but the sterling 
totals are not conversions of the declared values; they are conversions into sterling based on 
higher gross dollar totals that had been created in consular calculations set out solely in the 
appendix to the consular report. Th e fi gures were dramatically infl ated by a consular revaluation 
of the price of silk. Th e consular calculating operation was not made clear in the report, where 
the fi gures appear to be sterling equivalents of the declared values. In other words, there is 
neither a serious error in the fi gures, nor a gross confusion by the consul, but a contradiction, 
apparent rather than real, caused by the lack of an unambiguous statement drawing attention 
to the diff erent basis of the fi gures in the appendix.50 In a paradoxical way, these artifi cial 
divergences in the returns for Nagasaki and Yokohama actually validate the basic soundness of 
the fi gures. As they got access to more fi gures, British representatives in Japan became more 
critical, and their complaints became more substantive. In essence, their criticism was three 
fold. Th e fi rst point related to permits accepted by Custom Houses and the accuracy of the 
quantities stated on them. My own judgment of this type of complaint is that, while defects 
could indeed be detected, consuls exaggerated the extent to which the returns were defective. 
Th e second criticism was that Custom Houses too readily accepted declarations by merchants 
containing undervalued prices. British observers often noted undervaluation of prices in the 
Custom House as a failure of the statistics. Th e consequences of revision could be dramatic, 
as in 1863 in Yokohama, where silk was the dominant export, and the understated price was 
revised by the British in their return of trade for the year. Sugiyama asserts that all goods were 
undervalued, and that imports were undervalued more than exports.51 Th is weakness did exist, 
in my view, but it was not a fundamental statistical problem, as some modern writing has 
argued. Th ere are modern commentators who failed to make a clear distinction between routine 
underestimations in entries declared at the Custom House (inevitable in an ad valorem system), 
and a more technical issue relating to conversion problems when gold currency was converted 
at a fi xed and artifi cially high value on silver set by government fi at to be observed by Custom 
House offi  cers in converting prices in gold into prices in silver. Th is latter point constitutes 
the third criticism that occurs in the contemporary consular comment, and it is echoed in the 
66 Louis M. Cullen
modern literature. Th ere was never a problem in invoices for exports which were declared in 
silver, the currency of the ports, nor for imports coming from silver currency countries, where 
any conversion was a straightforward operation between two currencies backed by silver. It 
arose only for imports from gold currency areas. In that case, the problem arose not for reasons 
of exchange, as market rates of exchange were well established and known in the ports, but 
because Japanese offi  cials were tied to converting invoices in gold currencies at a fi xed rate. 
For purposes of conversion of invoice prices in gold currencies, the Custom Houses adhered 
to a valuation of 5.90 taels per silver dollar, the rate that existed at the time of opening of 
the ports.52 Although this rate remained fi xed in the Custom House calculations, by 1863 
the open market exchange rate had shifted to 3.37 taels to the dollar. Expressed in diff erent 
terms, the amount of sterling (a gold currency) that could be acquired with one silver dollar 
on the open market fell from between 5s.0d. and 5s.6d. to 4s.6d. In the market, then, but not 
in Japanese Custom House accounting, the value of silver currency had declined against that 
of gold currency. While aggregates for imports from silver currency areas were realistic, since 
they refl ected market rates, total imports were defl ated by understated fi gures for goods from 
countries with gold-based currencies. If gold was undervalued against silver in the exchange 
rate, conversion from gold to silver by a simple process of arithmetic automatically defl ated the 
total value. Th e situation may be illustrated by a simple hypothetical example of an invoice for 
£1000 sterling, offi  cial exchange rate of 7s.6d. sterling to the dollar, and current market rate of 
5s.0d. Conversion at the offi  cial rate would yield a dollar total of merely 2,664 dollars, while 
conversion at the market rate, used by merchants in their private accounting, would amount to 
4,000 dollars. Th e problem in the early 1860s was a temporary one, and it was protracted by 
Alcock’s reluctance to agree to change, as the rate was advantageous to foreign traders in settling 
accounts at the Custom House.53 Th e Tokugawa authorities in 1865 accepted a proposal from 
foreign countries that gold prices of imports should be converted at real exchange rates, with 
the result that overvaluation did not occur in the statistics of 1865 and 1866.54 
 
2. Improvements in Statistics from the Mid 1860s 
British representatives may have had doubts about the quality of the registers of permits 
or of the fi gures, but they conceded at a very early stage that progress had been made as far 
as access to data was concerned. Already in 1863, a new British offi  cial, Winchester, implied 
in an otherwise censorious report on Nagasaki that ready access to the records was at last now 
established.55 Th e report for Hakodate for the same year found Japanese offi  cials obliging, 
although two years later the British were alleging that the methods of the Hakodate Custom 
House were irregular.56 Starting with the reports for the year 1865 (submitted in early 1866), 
consuls were able to forward annual returns of trade for the open ports to the British legation in 
Edo with very little delay. Indeed, reports from consular stations with fi gures for the preceding 
year were often dated 1 January of the following year. Th is rapidity, astonishing by European 
standards, was made possible by the fact that, repeating the pattern of Tokugawa times, monthly 
summaries were circulated to interested parties or, if not circulated, at least accessible. To arrive 
at a cumulative total for the year, Japanese offi  cials had only to add fi gures for the fi nal month 
of the year to the total for the previous months, which was already known. Consular offi  cials 
seem to have relied on the annual fi gures from the Custom Houses, and either not to have 
received the monthly returns or to have ignored them. In observing in the spring of 1873 that 
the annual Kanagawa total for 1872 had been made from the aggregation of the monthly totals 
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received at the consular station, the consul seems to have been noting the fact as exceptional.57 
  A swift aggregation of fi gures within Custom Houses suggests an absence on the part of 
Japanese offi  cials of any process of revision or checking. Th e existence and retention of monthly 
fi gures would seem to account for the fact that, despite the loss of the records of the Custom 
House at Yokohama (Kanagawa) in late 1866, returns existed for much of the year. In applying 
to the Yokohama bugyō for “the usual Custom House returns” in early 1867, the Kanagawa 
consul was informed that they had been destroyed in a fi re the previous November. Th e same 
fi re had destroyed the records of the Chamber of Commerce, and no return was possible for 
1866.58 In contrast to Japanese offi  cials who possessed information for the preceding months, 
the Chamber of Commerce and consulate seemed totally bereft of fi gures. Th e consular station 
was unable to provide fi gures for 1866 to the legation in Edo, but after combing through the 
consular archives more than sixty years later, Paske-Smith was able to cite fi gures (presumably 
for the fi rst ten months of 1866). Th is suggests that monthly returns had been received, 
but ignored at the time. In May 1868, a British consular offi  cer took the liberty to pen an 
unprecedented adverse comment on the Kanagawa statistics. Writing up the report for the year 
1867, having had to use the 1865 fi gures as a reference point in the absence of fi gures for 1866, 
he remarked contemptuously: 
Although the desire always has been to accept the returns of the Custom House, such 
as they were, it was found impossible to do so for 1865, those furnished being found, 
after having been made up, so much below any reasonable estimate that they had to be 
thrown aside as worthless, and information sought in other directions.59
Turnover of consular personnel may be relevant. Myburgh, who wrote the report on 
1865, had taken up duty only on 4 January 1866, and may not have had suffi  cient time to 
make himself conversant with the fi gures; at any rate, he said little. Fletcher, the author of 
the hostile critique of the 1865 fi gures, was also a new man, and he supplemented his adverse 
comments with the self-justifying remark that “it is only lately that returns came into my hands 
and afterwards they had to be arranged into some sort of system.” Neither man appears to 
have had easy familiarity with, let alone mastery of, the fi gures that they commented on. Th e 
absence of any partial fi gure for 1866 shows that the consul was unaware of the existence of 
monthly returns, and suggests little statistical engagement with the Custom House offi  cials. In 
applying to the Custom House for a return for 1866—thereby exposing an attitude of passive 
reliance on Japanese offi  cers that would have been unnecessary for a consul who kept in regular 
contact—the British representative was unaware that the November 1866 fi re had destroyed all 
the records of the Custom House.  
Her Britannic Majesty’s consular offi  cers’ expressions of discontent raise as many questions 
about the offi  cers themselves as about the Japanese in these years. Criticism by British offi  cials 
was directed primarily towards the process of handling the permits (which incorporated the 
detail from merchants’ formal applications for them, and hence sanctioned the movement 
of goods), whether in terms of valuation of goods or defi ciencies in the quantities recorded. 
It was claimed that the Nagasaki Custom House returns for 1862 recorded exports of 554 
piculs of silk, whereas an account maintained by “mercantile agencies” reported 967 piculs.60 
As for prices, teas were regarded as undervalued in the Nagasaki returns, and British consular 
reports made upward adjustments to arrive at higher fi gures. Over-ready acceptance by the 
customs offi  cials of the entries submitted at the Custom House by merchants was set out at 
length by Winchester at Nagasaki in his report on 1862.61 As duties were on an ad valorem 
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base, there was a real incentive for undervaluing the amounts, and the British believed local 
merchants were taking advantage of the innocence or inexperience of the Japanese offi  cials. 
Th is was particularly the case for imports, with which many of the Custom House offi  cers were 
unfamiliar; undervaluations for exports were less marked. Undervaluation was of course never 
to go away entirely in a system in which goods were taxed ad valorem. By 1880, the view was 
that both imports and exports were undervalued though this was by now a minor issue. Exports 
tended to include prime cost only and shippers tended not to add in the extra cost incurred 
between purchase and shipment (that is, prices in practice were not on an f.o.b. (free on board) 
basis, and hence including all costs up to that point).62 Whatever the defi ciencies in Japanese 
fi gures, however, it is worth noting that the criticism is based on a newfound sophistication, 
which was emerging even in Britain only in and after the 1850s. In a longer time perspective, it 
is not productive to damn the fi gures; that merely hinders our progress toward understanding 
the economic phenomena of which they are indicators.
As remarked earlier, modern writers have been confused by a distinction, unrealistic in 
statistical terms, made by nineteenth century British offi  cials between the Custom House 
statistics of imports and calculations made primarily by the Chambers of Commerce(but 
widely quoted by consular offi  ces) of what they described as the “disposal” or sale of the goods. 
Few contemporary consular and trade offi  cials were troubled by the confusion that has affl  icted 
some historians and commentators. Th e estimates of disposals rested on offi  cial Japanese data 
of individual commodities adjusted by intelligence—perhaps not uniformly of high quality—
supplied by consular offi  cials, individual merchants and, above all, the chambers of commerce. 
Th e distinction was between customs fi gures, seen as a record of goods landed and warehoused, 
and returns emanating from the Chambers of Commerceand intended to record the “disposals” 
by importers to buyers. Disposals consisted of sales for the year, based on imports, adjusted by 
change in inventory on hand during the same period. As late as 1882, Sir Harry Parkes, the 
British minister who was a driving force behind the statistical work of his offi  cials, described 
the customs fi gures as “a record of importation and not of consumption.”63 Th is ignores the 
fact that the Custom House fi gures measured in concrete terms the transfer of goods between 
countries, whereas the consular and Chamber of Commerce offi  cials in the open ports put their 
energies into a bookkeeping exercise of their own devising that was susceptible to subjective 
manipulation of Custom House data. We can either take on trust their confi dence in the 
merit of the estimates they produced, or we can have doubts. Th ere are reasons for doubting 
the adequacy of the information from trader associations, and there is no evidence of British 
consular staff , at least, sharing statistical information with foreigners other than the Americans.
It has been suggested that the statistics fi rst reported as consular fi gures owed as much 
to the Chambers of Commerceas to the consuls. Sugiyama has expressed the sweeping view 
that “the method of compilation is not clear.”64 However, the methods of compilation are not 
in doubt. Th e Chambers of Commerceand consular offi  cials alike relied on the primary data 
from the Custom Houses, and for some of their observations they drew on trade information 
collected by individual merchants. Upon gaining access to the Custom House records, chamber 
offi  cials or consular offi  cials sometimes simply re-aggregated the quantities for individual 
commodities, and also adjusted prices. Th ese data rarely included gross fi gures for trade. In 
Osaka, which became an open port in 1868, a decade later than the other ports, the concept 
of “disposals” was more persistently pursued than in other ports. 65 Estimates of disposals were 
turned into fi gures intended to represent total disposals for the year. To a lesser extent, data 
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for exports also were adjusted, using criteria of foreigners’ specifi cation, to yield annual totals. 
However, even in the case of Osaka, a careful reading of the annual consular reports makes 
clear the diff erent basis of these calculations, and the situation was well understood by most 
of those involved. As discussion in the main body of annual reports shows, the principal value 
of disposal fi gures was to convey estimates of actual sales of individual commodities within a 
twelve month period, and the reader was referred to the appendices for tables from the Custom 
House. Where the current year was compared with preceding years, or where retrospective 
tables were given, the totals were invariably the fi gures provided by the Custom Houses. Put 
baldly, the Chamber of Commerce data are by no means statistics in the proper sense of the 
word. Even in Hyōgo/Osaka in the 1870s, where the emphasis on disposals was particularly 
strong, composite aggregates of imports were intended to be simply estimates of disposals, not 
substitutes for the offi  cial fi gures themselves. From 1873 onwards, the reader of British reports 
was referred for guidance on the overall trade of Hyōgo/Osaka to the statistics appended to 
the reports drawn from printed returns from the Custom House.66 A not unimportant reason 
for calculations by Chambers of Commercewas that the Custom House did not distinguish 
in its published totals between the various countries until the 1880s. Before that decade, the 
distinction was between vessels in terms of the fl ags of diff erent nations, but this was not 
helpful, as vessels very often carried the goods of other nations.67
3. Early Meiji Statistics
What happened in the immediate wake of the Meiji Restoration in terms of central 
direction of trade accounting is obscure. Modern accounts in Japanese simply refer to the role 
of “the competent authorities” (kantoku kanchō 監督官庁).68 By 1872, the Ministry of Finance 
had established full blown supervision, but the stages by which that supervision developed 
are not clear. Th ere is no suggestion that central control had already emerged in 1868. Th e 
fi rst steps in centralized management occurred as early as 1869 and 1870, when the Foreign 
Ministry seems to have compiled overall fi gures for the ports. Th e fi rst return by the Ministry 
of Finance was for 1871.69 Comments by consuls, particularly on the quality of the completed 
permit forms, began to become more positive. As early as 1870, Consul Lowder observed in 
his report on Kanagawa trade in 1869 that “a marked improvement is observable . . .  [T]hese 
returns may, therefore, be looked upon as more correct than those which have hitherto been 
supplied to this consulate.”70 Consular comment on the year 1871 at Kanagawa recognized the 
“improved administration” aff orded by “the governor and superintendent of Customs.”71 Th e 
report on the year 1872 conceded a close correspondence between Custom House fi gures and 
Chamber of Commerce calculations in the case of exports of “exceptional prominency,” and no 
“great discrepancy” in the Customs fi gures for imports.72 New forms issued from the customs 
were coming into evidence in 1872, and offi  cers in the ports were now under a compulsion to 
observe instructions from Tokyo.73 Th e fi rst bilingual reports from January 1873 were from the 
“Imperial Customs, Yokohama.”74 In the preface to monthly reports for the following year, the 
head of the offi  ce is identifi ed as Matsukata Masayoshi 松方正義, Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue, at the Ministry of Finance.75 Reference is also made in 1874 to a Statistics Division, 
which implies that statistical work had now become a specialized offi  ce within the Ministry of 
Finance. 
In 1874 the consul in Osaka, dissatisfi ed with fi gures on the spot, sought and got fi gures 
from the Imperial Customs in Yokohama.76 Th is was an episode which showed that the Custom 
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House in Osaka was answerable to a central authority, even if in this case no better fi gures were 
made available. Th e consular report published in 1873 on the Nagasaki trade of 1872 noted the 
use of many new forms by offi  cials, as well as a better conduct of business in a technical sense, 
notwithstanding the delay in the issue of permits: “It is a matter of general congratulation that 
greater care is now exercised in collecting the duties than used formerly to be the case.”77 
Th e Ministry of Finance, in contrast to the bugyō whose functions were manifold, was 
devoted exclusively to the raising of revenue and, of course, the control of expenditure to meet 
the pressing needs of a cash strapped state. Unlike the Foreign Ministry, whose initial role had 
been stop gap, the Finance Ministry had offi  cers of its own in the ports. Offi  cials trained in the 
old school of bugyōsho work with their local loyalties were replaced by new personnel and were 
closely supervised by a central administration whether they were new or old offi  cers. Under the 
old system of administration, instructions had been minimal. Th e only instance of instructions 
being issued is one within the framework of the 1866 negotiations between the bakufu and 
foreign diplomats, which set out a modest schedule of 53 items for exports and 83 for imports, 
plus short lists of goods which were duty free or prohibited.78 However, by 1872 the schedule 
of exports and imports had expanded to embrace 288 export and 1019 import items.79 Th e 
schedule not only listed items but also set out details, the better to illustrate how to treat the 
items for revenue collecting purposes. Such a schedule, applicable to all offi  cials, was essential 
for eff ective revenue collection and for statistics as well. Th e scope of the trade fi gures was also 
widened in 1873 to include a broad range of offi  cial purchases. While purchases of fi rearms 
and ammunition were included in the statistics at least from 1868, the fi gures were said to be 
below the actual amounts. Th e purchase of ships remained excluded, though the scale of these 
purchases both before and since 1868 was well known, and commented on by consular offi  cers 
among others.80 But from 1873, the year in which the Ministry of Finance took eff ective charge 
of the compilation of data, offi  cial purchases were estimated in full: the fi gures were as low 
as 797,395 dollars in 1873, and as high as 3,475,277 dollars in 1875.81 From 1879, offi  cial 
purchases were no longer identifi ed separately within the tables. With all these changes, in trade 
as in other areas, the statistical age had well and truly begun in Japan.
Th e pattern of monthly returns, well established in pre Meiji times, continued 
uninterrupted through bakumatsu and the early years of Meiji.82 It does not appear that there 
was a fast and hard rule as to whether consuls received monthly returns or only annual returns. 
In the problematic case of Kanagawa in 1866, the consul seems to have counted on an annual 
return and either did not receive, or disregarded, monthly returns. From 1873 onwards, the 
monthly fi gures provided the basis for the Ministry of Finance’s regular annual, and even half 
yearly, returns.83 From January 1873 onwards, copies of the monthly returns are fairly complete, 
and the few surviving documents are part of a now lost or dispersed but once large corpus.84 
Th ey served as the source for the monthly breakdown from 1873, published in later offi  cial 
documents.85
In the bureaucratic process of making statistical knowledge known within the 
administration, printed documents appeared at least as early as 1869. In the bakumatsu years, 
the British consuls were already receiving details of trade in the individual open ports, but 
the fi rst BPP reference to tables for all Japan in 1873 indicates an immediate awareness of the 
new Japanese reports. From January 1873, the preface to the monthly returns declared that 
“beginning with the fi rst month of the present year, a notice will be prepared here of exports, 
imports, values, quantities, and shipping, conveniently arranged for general information and 
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published under the title of ‘Tables of imports and exports at all the ports.’”86 Th e fi gures were 
all the more accessible by their publication in movable type, which replaced the cramped and 
rather diffi  cult presentation in the woodblock printing of earlier years. Th e publication of tables 
in movable type was also accompanied by a general tightening up in presentation. 
Figures for 1873, in the fi rst of the new annual returns took up 140 pages, and were 
diff usely structured with each port given separately. Later tables, showing the ports within a 
general tabular presentation, typically took up a mere seventeen to twenty three folios, and the 
new sophistication was refl ected in the fact that folios soon ceased to be described as pages. 
From 1873 onwards, the fi gures are fi nal versions and create no internal confusion. For earlier 
years the data appear to be drafts, and are far from problem free. Th e new presentation, together 
with the use of the English language, would seem to be consequences of recruiting English 
speaking foreigners in the early years of the Ministry of Finance, and the Statistics Division of 
that ministry is probably one of the fruits of the change. In typical fashion, however, Parkes’ 
attitude was begrudging. Th ough we may assume with confi dence that he knew of the new 
monthly reports, his immediate response was a call for a quarterly return.87 
Th e inclusion of fi gures from 1874 retrospectively in several compilations in the 1880s by 
the Ministry of Finance has led to a more formal status being accorded to them than to earlier 
fi gures. However, the fi gures for 1873 have clear cut internal evidence of their authority, and 
indeed are particularly informative on what was taking place within the Ministry of Finance. 
Reports in the 1870s were, however, not public documents; they were strictly speaking internal 
documents, made available to certain parties as a favor. Th is fact is refl ected in the wording 
of the BPP, which refers to being “furnished” with the reports. Th e Ministry of Finance’s fi rst 
formally published report concerned the trade of 1882, and was the prelude to a series of annual 
Ministry of Finance returns, appearing under the title of Dai Nihon gaikoku bōeki nenpyō 大日
本外国貿易年表 published by the Customs Bureau (Kanzeikyoku 関税局; later, Shuzeikyoku 
Daiichibu 主税局第一部, and variants).88 From the fi rst issue, the reports also included 
retrospective summary tables of export and imports in gold yen dating back to 1868. From 
the 1884 report onwards, a table was included for imports and exports of bullion and specie 
from 1872. Th e reports were immediately recognized by the British legation. Th e fi rst report 
was referred to in the legation’s own report, fi led on 15 July 1883, which stated that much of 
its analysis was based on the fi gures in it.89 For the early post 1882 years, surviving copies of the 
reports are few and are to be found only in the Finance Ministry Archive (Ōkurashō bunko大蔵
省文庫), the Prime Minister’s Offi  ce Bureau of Statistics Library (Sōrifu tōkeikyoku toshokan 
総理府統計局図書館), and the National Diet Library. Th is is a remarkable illustration of the 
poor survival rate of printed and manuscript documents, even in the conditions of early Meiji 
Japan. Th at the reports no longer appeared with the alarming speed characteristic of reports in 
the 1860s refl ected a greater degree of serious fi nal processing of fi gures.90 
Th e fi rst woodblock printed fi gures of exports and imports for the years 1869–1872 are 
now available in modern publication.91 Th ese fi gures were compiled under the aegis of the 
Foreign Ministry (1869, 1870) and Ministry of Finance (1871, 1872). For 1869, the surviving 
data are for quantities only, not monetary values. Th e fi gures for 1870 are not aggregated for 
the fi rst half of the year, and only incompletely for the second half of the year. Figures for 
1870 are valued in ryō, though the presence of a few fi gures in unconverted dollars supports 
the hypothesis that this document was not a fi nished one. For the year 1871, the fi rst year of 
Ministry of Finance management, totals were aggregated into gold yen, as of course they were 
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for 1872.92 It is very clear from the sparse surviving evidence that there was an ongoing loss of 
data through late bakumatsu and early Meiji years.
Statistical reports were printed from woodblocks only for a short time. Monthly, half-
yearly and annual fi gures were set in movable type from January 1873, in English as well as 
Japanese, and in modern—Western—tabular fashion. Close to this date, perhaps beginning 
earlier but certainly terminating in June 1874, an eff ort was made to gather retrospective runs 
of fi gures for preceding years. Th ere is a woodblock printing of a retrospective run of export 
quantities from 1866 to 1873 by the Customs Offi  ce, dated June 1874. Th ere also exists a 
manuscript document with a run of values as well as quantities in a remarkably neat and 
uniform hand, stopping short in 1872. Th e absence of corresponding runs of tables for imports, 
refl ects the confusion or loss of data characteristic of the pathetically small and defective corpus 
of surviving returns before 1873. Th e fact that the retrospective runs of fi gures for exports could 
be compiled up to 1872 and 1873 respectively shows that some data were to hand, and the 
tables are especially intriguing in hinting at some access to records preceding 1868, in other 
words for 1867 and 1866. (Th e latter is of course the year for which records for Kanagawa were 
lost).93 Th e Ministry of Finance observed in January 1873: “It cannot be said that the details of 
those statistics [of recent years] were carefully preserved.” 
Th e dearth of extant sources serves as a modern footnote to what the Ministry of Finance 
said in 1873. Yamaguchi and Ōuchi writing in 1968 drew on fi gures in the Ministry’s archives 
for 1869 and 1870, and in Tokyo University Economics Department for 1871 and 1872. 
Duplicates of fi gures for 1870–2 exist also in the Japanese National Archives (Kokuritsu 
kōbunshokan 国立公文書館), though its published calendar does not identify the sources 
from which they were acquired. Th e best guide to the early statistics is Yokohama shi shi: Shiryō 
hen and a series of photocopies in the Yokohama Kaikō Shiryōkan 横浜開港史料館.94 Th ere 
are trade returns in the National Diet Library 国立国会図書館 (though lacking one for the 
year 1869) in microfi lms, made in the 1960s from the Japanese National Archives and other 
sources.95 Th e Ministry of Finance’s own archives were destroyed in the 1923 earthquake. 
Microfi lms which the Ministry has deposited in modern times in the National Diet Library, 
and which it claims to comprise all the early material in its possession, originated in post 1923 
deposits in the Ministry, the Matsukata collection, and two collections deposited by the Matsuo 
松尾 and Shōda 勝田 families respectively.96 Th e Matsuo and Matsukata collections, thin for 
the 1870s, do not contain trade fi gures. Th e absence of statistics in the Matsukata deposit in 
the Ministry of Finance or in the published Matsukata papers is particularly to be noted, as 
Matsukata was head of the Customs Bureau in the 1870s.97 Th e sole case of a contemporary 
trade return (quantities in the second half of 1870) lies in the comparatively recent deposit 
in the National Diet Library of the papers of Inoue Kaoru 井上馨, Vice Minister of Finance 
1871–3, and the holder of many later offi  ces of state.98 Two modern writings, one in1962 and 
the other in 1968, refer to the existence of a return of trade fi gures for 1869 in the Ministry 
of Finance archives.99 As the Ministry of Finance archives are not now open to the public, 
the survival or current status of this very rare return is not known. Th e fi rst year of Meiji, 
1868, is even more sparsely documented: Yamaguchi and Ōuchi even speculate as to whether 
a return for that year had been compiled at all. In fact, one was attempted, and a return for the 
year survives in Kanagawa fu nisshi 神奈川府日誌 (Kanagawa administration daily register), 
though it is inevitably only in the form of an entry into the daily register.100 
An area of uncertainty is whether bullion and specie were included in trade totals. A 
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modern (1935) study, Nihon bōeki seiran 日本貿易精覧, suggests that exports for 1868–1871 
in the yen versions include movements of gold and silver (which would impede comparison 
with other years and with the BPP fi gures in general).101 Th e facts are far from clear, however. 
Th e totals of Japanese trade in the BPP are drawn from the Custom House data, and positively 
exclude currency movements. Certainly, Japanese and foreigners alike were aware of movements 
of precious metals and specie, and consular comment was accompanied by some fi gures. Th e 
BPP report of 1870 referred to heavy shipments of coin and bullion from Japan in 1869,102 and 
for the following year the report suggested that outfl ow of coin and bullion in 1870 was of the 
order of ten million dollars.103 Some statistics of bullion and specie existed and, as early as 1863, 
fi gures of movement in and out of Kanagawa were recorded.104 For 1871, Hyōgo/Osaka exports 
of treasure were estimated at 2,258,654 dollars by the Custom House, and at 5,019,011 by the 
Chamber of Commerce.105 Kanagawa consulate also reported fi gures for treasure for the same 
year.106 For 1873, details for all the open ports were reported.107
While general totals including gold and silver movements were given in BPP, consular 
offi  cials did not supply fi gures regularly or in standardized form. Th is suggests that information 
was not always to hand. It seems equally likely that knowledge on the Japanese side was 
imperfect. Revealingly, in 1882 the Ministry of Finance began a series of annual volumes of 
statistics on foreign trade (Dai Nihon gaikoku bōeki nenpyō), featuring a retrospective run of 
trade fi gures back to 1868, but the fi rst data for bullion and specie to be published appeared not 
in the volume for 1882, but two years later, and went back only to 1872. A note to the table in 
the 1884 Dai Nihon gaikoku bōeki nenpyō stated tersely, “Th e Statistic (sic) before year 1871, 
being uncertain, is excluded.”108 Th e dilemma facing contemporary editors may be seen from 
the tables of exports and imports for 1869–1872 published by Yamaguchi and Ōuchi in 1968. 
Th ere, bullion and specie are recorded for one year (1872) only, but duty free goods (in which 
category bullion and specie were included ) were for some reason declared “unclear” (fushō 不
詳) in the concluding summary table, and hence do not feature in the grand total for imports 
and exports. Th e 1872 count without the inclusion of bullion and specie in commodity tables 
at 16,847,033 yen, was higher than the 16,056,388 yen in the retrospective table compiled in 
1874. For imports, two gold yen counts and the dollar count are much closer together, seeming 
perhaps to cast doubt on the presence of a distorting coin and bullion total. From 1873, study 
of these issues becomes easier, but care is still required with crude totals. Cursory analysis of 
Finance Ministry returns in Meiji 1873–6, for instance, appears to suggest that bullion and 
coin were included in the grand totals for imports and re-exports in three of four years.
However, the complexity of fi gures for the early years is underlined by the wide divergences 
in 1868–1871 between totals in dollars and in gold yen (the latter by defi nition retrospective 
calculations for these years), and by a puzzling inconsistency between the profi le of totals of 
exports and imports in gold and silver prices. Data for the year 1872 illustrate the problem. 
Th ere are four separate counts for this year: one in dollars in BPP, one in gold yen from a 
contemporary Ministry of Finance table, one of exports from tables for seven years from 1866 
compiled in 1874 by the Ministry of Finance, and one in the fi rst (1882) volume of the Dai 
Nihon gaikoku bōeki nenpyō. For exports, all three gold yen counts fall far short of the BPP 
dollar count, which is known not to include bullion and specie movements. 
Problems of defi nition aff ecting the treatment of specie and bullion apart, misreadings 
in transcription and inconsistencies in aggregations may have compounded the errors in 
calculation of early statistics. Diff erences between fi gures might at fi rst sight seem to support 
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the observation by Sugiyama that alternative consular and offi  cial estimates continued to exist 
in early Meiji times, but the diff erences might also have arisen from prosaic errors. As returns 
from the Custom Houses to the central offi  ces of the Ministry of Finance up to the end of 1884 
were stated in dollars, a possibility of error resides in the Ministry of Finance conversions of 
the dollar totals into gold yen in early Meiji, when documents were confused and conversion 
rates between dollar and gold uncertain. Th is is particularly the case for the table of exports for 
1866–1872 in gold yen prepared by the Ministry of Finance in 1874; construction of the table 
involved retrospective conversions from dollar totals for 1866 and 1867 and from ryō totals in 
1868–1871. 
4. Th e Transition to the Yen
Th e currency system at national level in Tokugawa times had been in theory bimetallic 
(and even tri metallic, as there were three metals, gold, silver and copper). Silver had been 
the currency of Osaka and Nagasaki, and gold was the basic standard of Edo itself. Th e 
introduction in 1869 of a new gold ryō marked a stage forward in creating a formal national 
unit of accounting. Th e new ryō had no direct eff ect on other metals in circulation: it simply 
made existing Edo accounting practice into a national one. Two years later, in mid 1871, new 
regulations replaced the ryō by a gold yen as domestic unit of account.109 While in line with 
best new practice, it created a gold standard in internal payments. From the outset, the new 
system was a hybrid with a gold yen as the unit for internal payments, and a silver unit (the 
new silver yen in place of the Mexico dollar) intended to be confi ned to transactions within the 
open ports. Th e silver unit, the Mexican dollar, which was by informal agreement from 1859 
the accounting unit of foreign trade, became in 1871 the de jure unit of foreign trade with the 
introduction of a silver yen (of the same weight as the Mexican dollar). 
Given the monetary history of Japan and ready access to silver in east Asia, there were 
good practical reasons for silver becoming the de facto unit after 1859, and under the currency 
edict of 1871 it became in that year the de jure unit. Th e Mexican dollar was long the currency 
of account in international settlements in East Asia; its role in underpinning international 
business was enhanced by Hong Kong’s issue of a coin identical in weight. Much of the early 
trade with the West after 1859 was routed through China, a circumstance which helps to 
explain why a majority of the international residents in Nagasaki already in the 1860s and 
in Yokohama in the mid 1870s (the fi rst years for which we have statistics for the port), were 
Chinese.110 Japan faced the dilemma of being situated fi rmly in the silver currency region of 
East Asia and at the same time of having two Western countries as major trade partners. One of 
these, Britain, had long been on a gold standard, and the other, the United States, had been on 
it from 1873. With regard to exports, Japan operated the foreign trade of its open ports before 
and after 1871 either in Mexican (silver) dollars or in claims convertible into dollars, so that 
no problems of conversion arose when exports were declared at the Custom House in silver. 
Likewise in the case of imports, the conversion at the Custom House of prices on invoices from 
silver currency countries involved a purely routine conversion. Only invoices of imports from 
gold currency areas such as Britain presented a problem, but they accounted during the 1870s 
for two thirds of the import trade of Japan. Conversion between gold and silver currencies was 
not an intrinsically diffi  cult problem. It became problematic only because the conversion of 
invoices at a fi xed rate, abandoned in 1865, was in eff ect resurrected by the creation of a fi xed 
rate of exchange between silver and gold units in the 1871 currency edict. 
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Some words of explanation are necessary at this point on two distinct though overlapping 
issues. Th e gold ryō of 1869 had been a unit of account not physically embodied in a coin, and 
hence no rate of conversion between ryō and dollar had been settled. However, the new gold 
yen of 1871 created a problem in that it was accompanied by a formal silver standard confi ned 
to the open ports. A gold coin weighing 25.72 grains was the standard for the new gold yen; 
it was equal in value to a silver yen of 416 grains, that is the weight of the Mexican dollar. Th e 
mint ratio or exchange rate between the two metals at 1 to 16.2 refl ected the international rate 
of exchange of 1871. However, a fi xed ratio of exchange could only have worked in a closed 
system (a situation with which the 1871 act in creating a separate currency for the open ports 
had tried rather simplistically to grapple). Th ere were two consequences to the 1871 edict. 
Th e fi rst, a serious material one, was that gold was increasingly either exported or hoarded, 
since it could be purchased at the overvalued parity of silver in 1871, and as gold disappeared 
silver became a de facto standard beyond the ports. Th e second consequence, discussed below, 
was primarily a bookkeeping one, insert comma as customs offi  cers observed here the fi xed 
exchange rate between gold and silver settled in 1871 in converting invoices for the purpose of 
levying duties from gold currency countries. In doing so the totals were artifi cially depressed 
by a persistent fall in the value of silver on world markets undermining from the outset the 
rationale of a fi xed rate, and the sum total of the invoices by defi nition understated the real 
value of the trade.
Th e change of government in December 1867 had brought on apprehensions of currency 
destabilization. Uncertainty as to whether the new government would last combined with delay 
by that government in introducing regulations to meet its currency needs and gave rise to serious 
confusion. Good coin, whether gold or silver, was in the short term either hoarded or exported 
and, adding further to confusion, some of the exports were on government account. As a result, 
inferior and even unfamiliar coins, new and depreciated in metal, came into circulation, along 
with paper.111 Good quality silver and gold grew scarce as both were hoarded and the latter was 
sent abroad, and rates of exchange between coins fl uctuated wildly. In the volatile market of 
1871, for instance, the price of the nibu 二分金 (an alloy of gold and silver) varied by up to 30 
per cent.112 New coins provided for by the regulations of 1871 were slow to appear, and as late 
as 1872, the gold and silver yen had not reached Nagasaki. Increasingly, internal settlements 
were made in paper; the high discount on paper in the short term was less a refl ection of 
doubts about paper than of uncertainty about the worth of the coins, which were their ultimate 
guarantor of value. Paper in fact began to gain ready acceptance quite quickly, and eventually 
circulated at par or even at a premium. Th ere were two sharply contrasting currency markets, 
an internal one characterized by uncertainly and fl uctuations, and a foreign exchange market in 
which silver traded freely against gold in the ports. Without any undue problems, infl ows and 
outfl ows of coin refl ected either short term speculative purposes, or the transfer in metal one 
way or other of the net balance in total transactions on current and capital account.
Th e peculiar coexistence of two media of account, a silver unit for the ports and a gold unit 
for domestic transactions, has been responsible for the belief that it posed a special or complex 
statistical problem in calculating aggregates of Japanese trade. Th ere is, however, no reason why 
the existence of two currency zones of itself should present diffi  culties, and the undervaluation 
of the total value of trade would not automatically follow from the fact of operating in two 
currencies. Th e initial aggregating of invoices in diff erent currencies in the open ports would 
be a matter of elementary currency conversions, translating invoices that were not expressed 
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in silver into silver terms at market rates. Conversion between two metals was not of itself the 
root problem.113
Th e processing of statistical returns from dollar totals into the new yen should not 
have occasioned a problem, in theory, at any rate from 1872. For the years up to 1871, in 
retrospective calculations the fact that dollar and gold yen totals of foreign trade diff ered 
substantially reveals that there had been some other problem, not arising from the simple 
existence of two currencies. In 1868–1871, totals in dollars exceeded gold yen (as set out in 
the Ministry of Finance table for 1882) in three of four years for exports, and in one of four 
years for imports. Th ese fi gures originated in dollars converted at the time for the fi rst three 
years into ryō totals (and retrospectively into gold yen), and revised once more in or before 
1882. More puzzling at fi rst sight than variations from year to year between totals in dollars 
and in gold yen is the lack of consistency in the movement of converted totals as between 
exports and imports. Th e explanation is that there was strong Japanese demand for dollar coins 
because they could be used in re coining a defi cient supply of coin. One result was that foreign 
buyers of Japanese goods, benefi ting from the demand for silver in Japan, could dispose of 
their dollars at a premium. Japanese buyers of foreign goods might be able to pay in coin or 
paper money, but poor coin and paper were heavily discounted when they were accepted. 
It seems most likely that the Ministry of Finance made separate calculations using diff erent 
terms for exports and imports, taking account of the quite diff erent payment conditions for 
exports and imports respectively. After 1871, conversion from silver dollar totals to yen within 
Japan should have been at parity, at least in theory. In practice, this did not apply to the 1872 
fi gures. Th e 1872 fi gures for imports exhibit near concordance among diff erent estimates (a 
dollar total and two somewhat lower gold yen fi gures). On the other hand, for 1872 exports, 
the dollar estimate exceeded yen estimates by the largest margin recorded for either exports or 
imports in any year in 1868–1872. Th e discrepancies may be accounted for by the peculiar 
circumstances that caused bullion of all sorts to be in short supply in the early Meiji years. 
Given the demand for silver bullion to create new issues of both silver ichibu and alloys of silver 
and gold, foreigners imported dollars expressly to take advantage of a Japanese premium on 
silver dollars. Th e premium was supported by the siphoning off  of the dollar into the hands of 
currency speculators or into purchases at the mint that opened in 1871. 
Regarding the diff erences between yen and dollar aggregates in the statistics, Sugiyama 
observes, “After 1873, there is a fair degree of consistency between the two series of fi gures. I 
have been unable to fi nd a reasonable explanation of the continuing discrepancy in the period 
1869–1872.”114 However, he seems to have seen the problem as one of diff ering systems of 
recording fi gures rather than one of conversion rates. Th e diff erence between dollar and yen 
totals for the years 1868–1870, and equally for 1871 (when the offi  cial gold-silver yen parity 
was defi ned only in mid year) and 1872 refl ect several circumstances. For one thing, a widening 
medley of currency off ered in payment for imports made general calculations for converting 
annual totals of trade problematic. Another factor was that the market placed a premium on 
dollars as a means of payment for exports, despite the existence of an offi  cial fi xed rate for gold 
and silver yen. Th is benefi ted those who could pay dollars for their purchases. Demand for 
the dollar had been weak as late as 1866, but thereafter it usually commanded a premium.115 
Maintenance of a one-for-one parity was eff ectively impossible, and the evidence suggests that 
Japanese offi  cials in Tokyo recognized this. In the more orderly monetary situation of 1875, and 
in contrast to much higher premiums in prior years, a slight premium was offi  cially declared for 
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the silver yen: 100 silver yen exchanged for 101 gold yen.116 
Movement toward parity of yen and dollar was already evident in 1873–1875, though 
the momentum was not maintained in 1874, and wavered somewhat for several subsequent 
years.117 Th e Introduction to the Yokohama shi shi: shiryō hen of 1962, brief but by far the best 
analysis of the issue, observed that the fi gures were substantially the same from 1877.118 Yet 
some divergence still lingered on. Th e signifi cance of 1879 as a watershed in trends, however, 
is easily explicable. In 1878, Japanese authorities established a silver unit of currency equal to 
the dollar for general use (not just in open ports), and in 1879, they declared the parity of the 
dollar and silver yen. Earlier conversion of the dollar and silver yen into gold yen fl uctuated in 
tandem, and offi  cial attitudes to conversion are totally obscure. By the end of the 1870s, the 
Mexican dollar was still imported, but it had for all practical purposes disappeared from day-
to-day transactions.
As Custom House returns continued to be given in silver, the British consuls continued 
to tote up aggregates of trade from the returns from the individual Custom Houses; consular 
offi  cials did not immediately accept the new central returns in gold yen created by the Ministry 
of Finance counts. Copies of the original returns from the Custom Houses, which would have 
been in dollars, are not known to have survived. Only with the consular report in early 1886 
on the trade of 1885 did the British representatives switch from fi gures in dollars. Th e consular 
reports included in the BPP, thereafter, gave totals in sterling, converting on the basis of the rate 
for dollars or silver yen as quoted for the purchase of drafts drawn by merchants or bankers on 
London. One silver dollar was equated to one yen from 1885.
In previous accounts, the extent and duration of monetary confusion has been greatly 
exaggerated—particularly the duration. Misunderstanding has been reinforced by a view of 
paper money as one of its causes. In fact, the trend towards stability in conversion, already 
apparent in 1872, was itself a consequence of a growing preference for paper that facilitated 
stabilization of payments within Japan, and simplifi ed problems of settling on conversion rates. 
Contrary to statements that paper currency continued to depreciate, paper changed hands at 
parity with silver or even at a premium once the confusion of the early Meiji years passed.119 Th e 
infl ation following the Satsuma 薩摩 rebellion of 1877 was in no sense a proliferation of earlier 
monetary problems, but rather a straightforward case of a general infl ation caused by soaring 
expenditure and the sudden expansion in the issue of paper at that time. After 1881, it would 
be gradually reversed by the famous Matsukata defl ation. Th e large discount on paper in the 
wake of the 1877 rebellion is not germane to the exchange problem. It is a textbook case of an 
infl ated issue of paper in a budgetary crisis, and its eff ects are thus more easily comprehensible 
than the political and monetary complexities of the fi rst years after the Restoration. 
In understanding the currency problems of these years, two separate issues have to be 
distinguished. Th e fi rst is the declining value of silver in the wake of the fall in the price of 
silver bullion relative to the price of scarcer gold metal; this was a consequence of the increase 
worldwide in mining output. Th e Japanese government’s 1871 attempt to establish a fi xed rate 
was thus progressively more unrealistic. Th e second issue concerned conversion of gold prices 
into silver prices in import invoices. A fi xed conversion rate was settled by administrative fi at, 
as had been the case up to 1865. 
In regard to the fi rst of these two issues, Japan was on the way to becoming de facto a silver 
currency area, through the operation of Gresham’s law, which holds that bad money drives out 
good. A new silver coin issued from 1871 to 1877, intended to rank with the Mexican dollar 
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and to enlarge the supply of silver currency for a growing foreign trade, was confi ned to the 
ports.120 In 1878, a dollar coin identical to the Mexican dollar was made valid in all public 
and private payments throughout Japan, and in 1879 it was formally decreed the equivalent of 
the Mexican dollar. Circulating beyond the confi nes of the ports, it represented a late stage in 
currency reform, as Japan, although de jure bimetallic, came de facto to use silver as the medium 
of exchange. Th e scarcity of gold had threatened to undermine a monetary system in which 
gold was the basic standard for internal trade. Silver infl ow was sizable in 1882–1884, and 
movements of gold either way had become small and few. In 1883, interest on kinsatsu 金札, a 
form of government bond, originally issued in both silver and gold was made payable solely in 
silver. Th is was an implicit admission by the Meiji government that the country had moved to 
a silver standard.121 Gold was not abandoned in a formal sense, but the 1878 authorization of 
national circulation of a dollar coin meant that, for all practical purposes, a silver standard was 
in place, and would prevail until the Japanese government offi  cially adopted the gold standard 
in 1896.
Over the course of the 1870s and 1880s, silver purchased progressively less gold. Th e 
relationship was commonly expressed in the amount of sterling acquired by the dollar in drafts 
drawn on London. It could also be expressed, although more rarely, in terms of the relationship 
between the gold yen and the silver yen, which was beginning to replace the dollar as the 
currency standard of Japanese ports. In gold yen-silver yen quotations, the purchasing power of 
the gold yen became progressively greater after 1880. Gold yen were at a premium throughout 
1882, for example, as quotations averaged about 92 1/2 gold yen for 100 dollars.122 Exchange 
quotations for gold yen in terms of silver yen rather than the dollar, departing from their formal 
parity, were a new bookkeeping convention to express actual transactions in the ports where the 
silver dollar exchanged against foreign gold currencies, and signifi ed that the silver yen (despite 
or because of its parity with the dollar)  was beginning to acquire an identity in its own right. 
Th e second complex issue in this story of the two metals was the fi xed rate used for the 
conversion of gold prices in import invoices into silver prices. After 1871, there were two 
exchange rates for conversion of gold yen into silver dollars, the open market rate determined 
solely by currency transactions in the ports, and a fi xed rate for gold standard currencies solely 
for Custom House transactions. For sterling the rate was settled at 4.88 dollars to the pound 
sterling (or 4s.1d. for the dollar). Conversions at this rate became unrealistic in the long term. 
Th e dollar, worth 4s.1d. in sterling as late as 1875, was only 3s.8d in 1884, and by 1887 it was 
down to 3s.2d.123 Th ese rates are evidence of the strengthening of the British pound; in the early 
1860s, a Mexican silver dollar had been equivalent to 5s. or 5s.6d. 
So long as the government-fi xed rate of gold-silver yen exchange was in place, it was 
benefi cial to traders. It was of no consequence as far as the settlement of daily private trade 
accounts was concerned, but when settling payment of ad valorem duties traders declared 
transactions at rates that greatly overvalued silver compared with actual market conversion 
amounts. Japanese government adherence to the fi ction of an unchanging gold-silver rate 
thus entailed a loss of revenue to the treasury. In bookkeeping, when invoices fi gures were 
aggregated, statistics of imports were understated. Th e anomaly was fi nally ended in the last 
quarter of 1888 when imports and exports were valued in identical fashion on a basis intended 
to refl ect the market prices of silver. A year later, the results were set out clearly in the British 
consular report for 1888:
For the fi rst nine months of the year 1888, every pound sterling of the original cost of 
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all English and American articles of import was entered in the customs returns as 4 dol. 
88 c., whereas, throughout the whole of the year 1889, each pound was entered at values 
varying each quarter, but the average of which for the whole year was 6 dol. 46 c.124
In the aggregates for 1888, the fi gures for the fi rst three quarters were adjusted to conform 
to the new basis introduced for the fourth quarter. Th e sharp rise in the total value of imports 
over 1887 is nominal, not real; it refl ects the adjusted exchange calculations of the Custom 
House. From 1888, totals were by defi nition realistic. When the fi xed rate for conversion of 
gold into dollars was abandoned later in 1888, the Ministry of Finance did not recalculate past 
fi gures (apart from fi gures for the fi rst three quarters of 1888). Some scholars, notably Tatemoto 
and Sugiyama have taken it on themselves to revise the fi gures for the years prior to 1888 in 
order to take account of past systematic understatement in the fi gures for imports. 
Superfi cial diff erences between published runs of fi gures could be taken to support the 
argument that separate compilations of fi gures were created in the ports or, alternatively, that 
great confusion existed in processing data. Runs of data in dollars and gold yen respectively 
might appear to support the existence of distinct or separate fi gures. Th us export fi gures are 
presented in the Yokohama shi shi in dollars for both Yokohama trade and national trade,125 but 
more commonly, as in Baba and Tatemoto (1968),126 Sugiyama (1988), and other recent works, 
they are in gold yen. Th e Yokohama shi shi fi gures down to 1884 were drawn from BPP, and 
thereafter from the offi  cial Nihon gaikoku bōeki nenpyō.127 
Scholarly recalculation to take account of undervaluation of imports was fi rst executed by 
Tatemoto, and later by Sugiyama.128 Th is is not a straightforward exercise. It is relatively easy 
from the mid 1870s as gold and silver units of account were close to parity. As Sugiyama noted, 
it is fraught with serious problems between 1869 and 1873, given diff erences in the fi gures. 
For this reason, Sugiyama attempted major recalculations only for the years 1874–1887. He 
did also, however, make an eff ort also to revise the fi gures for imports and exports for the years 
1860–1868.129 He posited that 1869 was a “normal” year, and for 1860–1868 he converted 
dollars into yen on the basis of the margin of excess of yen for dollars, shown by comparison of 
the two measures for 1869 (namely, the BPP and Ministry of Finance fi gures). If this is a correct 
interpretation of what he says he did, his methods are untenable. Th ey could only end in an 
arbitrary result. It is contentious, to say the least, to regard 1869 as in any sense “normal.” Th e 
relationship between various fi gures in 1869 (or in any other year) is a product of a number of 
factors about which we know too little.130
5. Th e Merits of Japanese Statistics
Over the 1870s, British consular acceptance of the Japanese fi gures became ever more 
positive. Even if the Nagasaki consul complained of “a diffi  culty in getting reliable statistics” in 
his report in early 1874, he conceded that “the better regulations now existing at the Custom 
House render this not so insuperable an obstacle as formerly.”131 While the consular report 
on Kanagawa for 1878 found that the Custom House data did not agree in all respects with 
Chamber of Commerce estimates, it declared them “tolerably correct.”132 Some problems were 
now of a diff erent order, and arose from defi ciencies in Chamber of Commerce data. Th us, 
the Chamber of Commerce in Kanagawa enumerated silk in bales in its 1880 accounts, while 
customs fi gures reckoned trade by weight. Th e Chamber of Commerce rate of conversion of 
bales into piculs underestimated the weight of bales.133 
Osaka, an open port only from 1 January 1868, nine and a half years later than the other 
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ports, seems to have been out of step with this story of improvement, at least in its fi rst years of 
foreign trade. It is hard, however, to draw a line between objective weaknesses in the Custom 
House and the idiosyncrasies or limitations of Abel A. J. Gower, the consul from 1869 to 1873. 
For 1868, Acting Consul J. F. Lowder had simply reported the Custom House fi gures without 
comment.134 For 1869, however, Gower provided fi gures based on “private information” then, 
inconsistently, relied mainly on “the very imperfect Custom House return” for 1870.135 From 
reluctant acceptance of the Custom House returns for 1870, he progressed to outright hostility 
to Custom House data for 1871 and 1872, and he assembled fi gures of his own from the 
applications for permits in those years. His doubts were fuelled by fi gures for disposals compiled 
by the Chamber of Commerce. Th e divergences between the Custom House fi gures and the 
Chamber of Commerce calculations led him, in February 1872, to go so far as to declare 
the “worthlessness of the Japanese returns.” He dismissed the applications for permit forms 
as improperly fi lled in, to the extent that “the labor spent in endeavoring to compile correct 
Tables is little better than lost.”136 His view was no less strong in the following spring, when his 
report on the trade of 1872 contained the following phrase critical of Japanese offi  cials: “Th e 
Custom House authorities [have not] yet adopted any proper system of preparing the returns 
themselves”.137 Compiling his report for the year 1873, he applied to the Ministry of Finance 
customs offi  ce in Yokohama for returns, apparently because of dissatisfaction with those received 
locally, and lamented that the employment of foreigners (presumably in Yokohama) had failed 
to raise the statistical standard.138 Gower’s failure to appreciate that estimates of disposals and 
Custom House returns had fundamental diff erences deepened his dismissive attitudes. Th e fact 
that, unlike other consuls, he did not use the actual term “disposals” in his writing suggests 
that he was oblivious to deeper statistical distinctions. His shallow understanding, and his 
helplessness implicit in his reliance on the Custom House data “principally” for 1873—despite 
repeated strictures on them—contrast with the measured and competent assessment of the 
fi gures for 1874 and 1875 by his successor, Acting Consul (later Consul) A. A. Annesley.139
Whatever the early defi ciencies, things were steadily put to rights by the Osaka Custom 
House. Proper attention to the Application for Permit forms was, of course, a vital base for 
statistical progress. A tightening in administration seems to be acknowledged in the report for 
1872, even by the choleric Gower. Th e consul, while complaining of the absence of a system 
for preparing returns, noted “a marked improvement” in the quality of the fi lling in of the 
application forms themselves.140 Gower did not attach weight to the fact that the relationship 
of Custom House and Chamber of Commerce fi gures was not consistent from one year to the 
next. For the year 1871, he merely noted that aggregates based on Application for Permit forms 
fell short of the Chamber of Commerce fi gures, while in the following year the aggregation 
of Custom House fi gures for imports exceeded the chamber fi gures.141 He did not dwell on 
the contrast, but contented himself with dismissively attributing the diff erence in the 1872 
fi gures to the omission of small parcels from Chamber of Commerce fi gures. Th is was facile 
and even evasive. Th e report on the trade of the year 1874 by the new consul provided both 
Custom House and chamber fi gures, and demonstrated an appreciation of the fundamental 
diff erences in the two statistical concepts. A positive (if understated) note appeared in the 
Osaka consul’s report on the following year (1875), which remarked on the “tolerably relative 
accuracy” of Custom House fi gures.142 His report for 1876 conceded the “fair correctness” 
of the Custom House fi gures for imports, where the statistical divergence with Chamber of 
Commerce numbers was largest.143 
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Diff erences between Custom House returns and Chamber of Commerce estimates of 
“disposals” (which have led to modern confusion that there were two statistical counts) were 
occasionally noted in Kanagawa, e.g., in the report for 1872,144 but consular reports from 
Kanagawa, apart from the special case of 1863, were based virtually without qualifi cation on 
the Custom House fi gures. “Disposal” was taken as a statistical concept primarily of use for 
illustrating the progress of individual trades. Consuls who followed Gower in Osaka were very 
much alive to the issue, but the concept of disposals continued to hold a prominence in reports 
from Hyōgo/Osaka, which it did not in other reports. Th is seems to have been a consequence 
of the emergence by 1871 of a very vigorous Chamber of Commerce, which devoted a lot of its 
energies to calculations of trade. 
Th e attitudes of consular offi  cials in Hyōgo/Osaka were also colored by problems of 
transshipment, that is the arrival in any open port by coastal shipping of goods for export, 
or the dispatch by coastal shipping of goods from abroad. Th e transshipment issue was not 
confi ned to Hyōgo, but it did loom larger there than elsewhere because the port was located 
at a central point on the long coastline between Nagasaki and Yokohama. Th e problem of 
transshipment was not in statistical terms a specifi cally Japanese one. It was universal, solved in 
Europe at an early date only by acceptance of the practice of recording goods shipped between 
domestic ports at the fi rst point of landing or last point of departure. Transshipment was fi rst 
highlighted by the exports of tea, for which the issue arose as soon as Osaka became an open 
port: the Custom House counts of exports of tea in Osaka and Hyōgo proved to diff er widely 
from the fi gures compiled by the Chamber of Commerce for 1868–1871. Th e Custom House 
fi gures notably exceeded the chamber’s calculations even after adjustment for omissions in the 
chamber’s fi gures in 1869 and 1870 was taken into account, and fell below them in 1868 and 
1871. Th e erratic pattern was determined by the statistical fortunes of tea, depending on whether 
it was counted as a direct shipment from Osaka to the United States or as a transshipment via 
Yokohama. Export totals in the Custom House returns for 1868 and 1871 greatly exceeded 
Chamber of Commerce estimates or counts (made with access to the record of permits in the 
Custom House), and an Osaka consular offi  cial observed that “it is possible the customs may 
include them in the shipments to the latter port [Yokohama], while the Chamber properly 
includes them in the direct shipment to New York.”145 He was speculating that Osaka Custom 
House clerks recorded Osaka goods destined for transshipment from Yokohama as domestic 
(coastal) trade items, not as export trade items. Th e inconsistency between years would suggest 
a variable practice at Osaka, with tea sometimes included as an export and on other occasions 
treated as a coastal shipment.
In late bakumatsu times and in early Meiji years, Custom House offi  cers kept an account of 
both direct imports and exports and of intra-trade between the open ports. Th us the Kanagawa 
(Yokohama) consular report for 1869 gave totals of trade for both categories. Imports of 24.3 
million dollars included 17.4 million dollars of direct imports and 6.9 million dollars of foreign 
goods transferred from other open ports. Exports were 14.5 million dollars: 11.5 million dollars 
of exports originating in the ports and 3.0 million dollars originating in transfers from other 
open ports.146 Th e scope for double counting thus appeared in early statistics. In the case of 
imports, goods transshipped at Yokohama to Osaka/Hyōgo in 1873 and 1874 appeared as fresh 
imports in Osaka fi gures, “and have thus been entered twice in the Custom House returns.”147 
Parkes in Tokyo noted in 1874 the need to keep apart the fi gures for transfer trade and foreign 
trade.148 Th is was notoriously a problem for the early fi gures for Osaka. In the case of exports, 
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the anomalies that had led to double counting seem to have been winkled out in time. In 1879, 
tea shipped in Osaka to Yokohama for the United States was not counted at the Custom House 
in Osaka: the consular offi  cer, noting that the customs returns were not a complete account of 
tea passing through the port, obtained an estimate from the American consulate of the amounts 
where the ultimate consignees were in the United States.149 In the case of imports, we can say 
that foreign goods arriving from Japanese ports were not included in Hakodate returns, at least 
on the evidence of Hakodate fi gures for goods from Nagasaki and Yokohama in 1864 and from 
Yokohama again in 1881.150 Nor, it appears from evidence in 1881, did Osaka totals record the 
growing infl ow of foreign textiles arriving via Yokohama.151 
6. Conclusion 
Th e statistical achievements of the 1860s and 1870s were real. Th e early years were slowed 
by the fact that the fi rst statistics were collected by bugyōsho offi  cials. Eff ective administration 
had to await centralized supervision, which was instituted fi nally in 1873. Japanese statistical 
achievement in the 1870s was not confi ned to trade statistics. A modern style population census 
did not take place until 1920, for economic reasons, but already in the 1870s, offi  cials  very 
cogently made the case for a census. For the short and medium terms, improvements in the 
system of household registration of Tokugawa times made it possible to go without one. Th e 
lament of British offi  cials in 1873 that “[i]n Japan, the science of statistics is in its infancy” was 
disproved by the rapidity of advances in the 1870s;152 over the decade, statistical defi ciencies 
were addressed. Of course, statistical information was of value only to those who had ready 
access to the fi gures. Limited access was a point of adverse British comment as late as 1877, 
but this defect too was addressed.153 For trade, well prepared publications began to appear from 
1873 onwards in a form easy for Westerners to assimilate. Th ese were not formal publications. 
Regular annual publications of trade statistics would debut in 1882. Early Meiji publications 
containing trade fi gures, moreover, were but one element in a much larger array of offi  cial 
publications, akin to those of Western countries. Most were in Japanese, though some also 
in English. By the late 1880s, the British Parliamentary Papers document the circulation to 
newspapers of summaries of a year’s trade at the outset of the following year.154
Th ere are two ways of looking at the trade statistics of bakumatsu and early Meiji Japan. 
One is the unrealistic and culturally arrogant one of damning them because they fell short of 
Western standards. Th e other is to see them from the outset as a success. Th e task was to collate 
the new detail collected in the Custom Houses into statistics. Th ose Custom Houses themselves 
represented an institutional innovation. After 1868, this decentralized work had to be brought 
into a centralized structure, producing in the process more eff ective and accessible fi gures. Th e 
process of centralization, tracing its origins back to 1859, required a whole sequence of events: 
fi rst, a response within the bugyō offi  ces of the ports in collecting duties and in assembling the 
detail into statistics of trade which we can date to 1859–1867; second, imposing centralized 
direction on this work in 1868–1871 and, from 1871, of doing so under the aegis of the 
Ministry of Finance; and fi nally, streamlining procedures and publication in the period 1873–
1882. Th e major achievement was that the work approached Western standards within about 
fi fteen years from the opening of ports in 1859. 
Trade fi gures have to be respected on their own terms. Japan presents an unusual problem 
in that it had to adapt to a pattern of fi nancial settlement introduced by Westerners in the 
1850s that made the dollar the unit of account and the most common medium of exchange in 
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the open ports, despite the fact that gold was the currency of Edo (and from 1871, the unit of 
account for all Japan). Japan also had to cope with the fall in value of silver, a vitally important 
medium of exchange. Japan was not alone in having to deal with such problems, but as its 
foreign trade burgeoned, and as it found itself involved in two currency regions, it had a hard 
row to hoe. All early commodity statistics are defi cient for balance of payment purposes, whether 
in prices or in omission of categories of goods. For calculating the commodity component of 
the balance of payments, it is legitimate to attempt to adjust them. In the case of the United 
Kingdom, for instance, this was done to great eff ect by A. H. Imlah in his Economic Elements in 
the Pax Britannica.155 However, such calculations have to be confi ned to specifi c purposes with 
caveats about their own limitations, if applied to wider ends. If they are quoted not as estimates 
for a well defi ned purpose but treated as a critique of the statistics themselves, then they result 
in some misunderstanding of the problems and an underestimation of the achievement itself. 
Where, as in Japan’s case, there is a belief that several sets of trade statistics exist, new attempts 
to calculate statistical series for commodities pose a danger of adding to the confusion. 
Th e gathering of statistical information and its processing into aggregates of trade were 
more systematic and successful than critics charged. Japan’s success in creating modern statistics 
was quite impressive. Th e fact that consular offi  cials over the 1870s increasingly conceded the 
merits of the fi gures illustrates this. Chamber of Commerce calculations were never seen as 
alternative to the Japanese statistics; nor was there a basis for serious criticism of these statistics 
by the late 1870s. Indeed, it is ironic that, although the BPP are the best and most convenient 
source for trade statistics up to the mid 1880s, the comments in the BPP up to the 1870s 
have been responsible for a very negative view of the data at large. Th is is not least owing to 
the failure of modern commentary, Japanese and English alike, to understand the signifi cance 
of the “disposals” concept to which contemporary English diplomats and consular staff  had 
attached so much importance.
Th e statistics are, of course, not perfect. Th e lack of c.i.f. (cost of insurance and freight 
included) and f.o.b. (free on board) defi nitions marks them off  from other fi gures. However, 
European trade fi gures also adjusted to demands for greater precision about defi nitions only 
late in the day. Here it is important to bear in mind the defective valuation of imports to 
Britain to 1854, highlighted in Imlah’s study. Even after 1854, the Board of Trade in London 
at fi rst valued imports and exports simply by canvassing dealers for price information. Declared 
values (that is, values as declared at the time of making entry at the Custom House) became 
the practice in Britain only from 1868, but they had been the norm in Japanese statistics from 
1859.156 Moreover, given the defi ciencies in Japanese statistics in recording ships, it is salutary to 
recall that in Britain, a ship exporting country, ships sold abroad were not included until 1899, 
and fi gures of imports of coin and bullion were collected only from 1858.157 If we regard f.o.b. 
and c.i.f. price defi nitions as a refi nement of very recent origin, and not as a canon for judgment 
of mid nineteenth century statistics, Japanese fi gures were collected and totals aggregated 
effi  ciently by the late 1870s. From 1875, the earlier omission of the major part of purchases 
on offi  cial account was remedied.158 Criticism on c.i.f. and f.o.b. grounds was imprecise in the 
1860s and 1870s because the concept was a new and unfamiliar one internationally. While 
some relevant observations on the score of valuations were made in the early 1860s, the main 
concern was one about disposals, a concept that ran counter to the entire object of statistics of 
international trade. By the 1890s, it was less a question of remedying defects than of adopting 
more advanced statistical concepts that had become widely recognized only in the immediately 
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preceding decades.
Th is article has examined the Japanese capacity to collect statistical information and retain 
a record of it. A study such as this should be placed in the context of the archival history of 
Japan. Part of that is the story of destruction by fi re or war, but the absence of records is more 
often due to the fact that records were not retained. Th e diff use copying of the records by or 
for offi  cials was both a product of such a system and, at the same time the means by which 
some material for the years before 1868 has survived in random fashion. It is striking, given the 
nature of the system, that it was private (or at least unoffi  cial) copying, usually into manuscript 
notebooks (shahon 写本), that ensured that many statistics survived. As proof of how fragile 
the source base is, we need merely point out that the actual counts in dollars for the years 
1859–1884 are known only from BPP. Th e British reporting shows evidence that its authors 
sometimes consulted the Americans, who retained records of their own on trade. Th e British 
sources are the best known, largely because of the magnifi cent series of consular reports in  BPP, 
and their prompt publication. As early as the 1880s, they provided data for the fi rst Japanese 
scholars of foreign trade, and their fi gures have often been repeated in later studies both in 
Japan and abroad. Th e Japanese trade of other Western countries, except the United States, was 
relatively small, but a consultation of their consular sources, manuscript or published, should 
in all probability add to the story of relations between offi  cialdom and the new communities 
of the open ports, and perhaps to our understanding of the evolution of the data themselves.
Th e sheer capacity of the Japanese administrative system to function through the 
bakumatsu and early Meiji years is noteworthy. Th e ability of the system to function in crisis, 
as in the 1850s and 1860s, is important; it is a measure by which to assess bakumatsu society 
and polity in general. It suggests we need to qualify widely held assertions of administrative 
breakdown. It has been assumed that the absence of statistical information itself points to 
administrative failure in the 1850s. Th e capacity, however, was there, as indicated by the fact 
that the British diplomat Mitford got a full summary of the census of Osaka for 1866 even 
though the last known fi gures from the Japanese side are for 1862.159 Trade fi gures existed in 
the 1850s and 1860s, and an ability to innovate is illustrated in particular by the fi gures for 
Ezo 蝦夷 imports to Osaka in 1856–1858 or for Edo in 1856. As statistics are a creation of 
administration, their existence, even if we can document them only imperfectly, shows that the 
Japanese administration remained in working order.
APPENDIX
Appendix 1: Th e Paske-Smith Figures for Exports and Imports in the Open Ports
Th e much quoted fi gures compiled by Paske-Smith for his book in 1930, together with 
other data principally drawn both directly and indirectly from British sources, are the basic 
fi gures around which Ishii in 1944 built his tables of the fi rst decade of Japanese trade in the 
open ports. It is a matter of interest, therefore, to seek the identity of the sources Paske-Smith 
drew on in 1930, especially given some wide variations in his fi gures from those in the BPP. 
(Paske-Smith does not appear to have consulted parliamentary papers at large, though from 
internal evidence at least one paper in either published or draft form was available to him.) An 
answer to the question is all the more pressing as early consular records for Japan are not listed 
in the 1963 Guide to the Contents of the Public Record Offi  ce, part 2 (1973), p. 142. Details 
appear only in the very recent on-line listing of records. Th ey also have high list numbers, 
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which seems to confi rm that their listing is comparatively recent. Th e records seem to have been 
“repatriated” to London at the outset of 1942. For Yokohama, local consular records exist from 
the last quarter of 1923 and again from 1945, although the earlier records were destroyed in 
the earthquake. From Nagasaki, they run from the outset of the mission to 1937. None now 
exist for Hakodate, and no pre Second World War records exist for Osaka/Kobe. It would seem 
then that Paske-Smith would have had easy local access to statistical material in the 1920s. Th e 
abrupt end of the Nagasaki records in 1937 suggests that, perhaps, records to that day had 
already been transferred to Tokyo for unknown reasons before the war crisis. Th e absence of 
consular records for Hakodate and for Osaka might appear speculatively a result of misfortune 
in their transfer, or of the sheer impossibility of moving records at short notice, from remote 
locations to Tokyo in 1942.
Apart from consular archives, early archives of the embassy (and former legation) itself were 
already in London in the FO 242 series. Th is series, though principally one of correspondence 
with London and of miscellaneous correspondence, proves on inspection to have incoming 
consular letters to Edo (Tokyo) from 1858–9 for Hakodate, from 1859 for Nagasaki, from 
1862 for Kanagawa, and from 1868 for Hyōgo. While these transferred series in general are held 
to be very defective, the FO 262 series for the Japanese volumes consulted seems more or less 
complete in some but not in other years. Eff ectively, the incoming letters from consulates touch 
fl eetingly on other issues, while dealing mainly with establishment matters and in fascinating 
detail with the working of extraterritoriality (the legal functions exercised by consular stations). 
Th us, while consular archives no longer survive for any consular post except Nagasaki prior 
to 1923, the FO 262 series serves as surrogate consular archives up to a point. Th e Kanagawa 
consular offi  ce was unaff ected by the great fi re in 1866 in Yokohama (though the records of 
the Chamber of Commerce were destroyed). Remarkably, and as a sign of how little regular 
statistical contact offi  cials actually maintained with the Custom Houses, the consul became 
aware of the destruction of all of the records of the Yokohama Custom House only when he 
applied on 26 March 1867 for trade fi gures for 1866 (Consul to minister, Tokyo, Kanagawa, 3 
April 1867, FO 262/133, f.75).
Th e incoming correspondence includes the draft annual reports, which appear with very 
minor change in the published BPP. Th ere is however surprisingly little reference to statistical 
issues in the incoming letters, which would suggest that they took up little of the routine time 
of busy offi  cers, and would also explain their unease, faced with a demanding annual chore, in 
handling statistical matters and at times for their very testy comment.
Th e only true early consular archives prior to 1923 (i.e. archives maintained at a consular 
station) are those of Nagasaki, which are extensive though not complete for the early decades 
but fuller in these years than for later times. Documents of particular interest are two copy letter 
books, one containing the text  of letters in Dutch, almost all to the “governor” of Nagasaki 
for June 1859–December 1862 (TNA, FO 796/18); the other to local Japanese offi  cials 3 
Jan.1863–29 Oct.1866 (TNA, 796/25). In addition to letter books for copies of outward 
letters from Nagasaki, there survive in broken fashion volumes of loose letters, variously 
incoming or outgoing, some in draft form (i.e. prior to their translation into Japanese) and 
some incoming letters in Japanese. In the present context, given the tensions displayed in the 
reports in BPP over access to or adequacy of statistical information, the most striking point is 
the high handedness of the language often employed by consular offi  cials.
Th e Nagasaki records are a remarkable illustration of a consular station at work. However, 
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reference to trade is sparse, arising from individual cases concerning customs duties (an issue 
lacking in the surrogate FO 262 series). On infrequent occasions, the extraterritorial issue 
involved customs or trade regulations in regard, for example, to breaking bulk outside the offi  cial 
opening hours of the Custom House. Hakodate, in particular, was a place of little trade (with 
accounts in the early years of often uncooperative or allegedly irregular behavior by Custom 
House offi  cials often taking pride of place in reporting). However, it had an importance as 
whalers sailed in northern waters, and it was also a useful watching post for observing Russian 
intentions in the region. A palpable fear of Russian encroachment can be seen in the letters to 
the legation in Edo, a subject of even more concern to the Japanese themselves, of course. In 
1862, in the course of a long letter on the Russian problem, the British consul observed that 
“the highest Japanese functionary trembles before the lowest Russian adorned with a white or 
yellow cap-band” (TNA, FO 262/44, fl l.21–34 Enslie to legation, 2 Sept. 1862). A general 
impression from the records is of a well organized and effi  cient consular service maintaining 
close ties with the legation.
Appendix 2: Return of Osaka Coastal Trade for 1866
Th e Osaka bugyō told a British offi  cial in 1867 that some fi gures for coastal imports, though 
they did not cover all commodities, existed, and he duly provided details of 20 commodities.160 
Th ey are reproduced here as they have not been adverted to in modern works.
            Coastal Imports in Osaka, 1866
Rice                                                   311,258 koku
Other cereals and vegetables          64,535 koku
Oil                                         23,932 koku (sic)
Soy                                         11,000 tubs
Salt                                                    916,270 bags
Charcoal                                    1,253,880 bags
Wood                       921,540 bundles
Seaweed                                        24,900 bundles
Dried bonito                                        63,560 kuamme (3,972 piculs)
Teas                                                   104,470 kuamme (5,779 piculs)
Paper            134,00 bundles
Floss silk                                       22,500 bundles
Vegetable wax                                      47,290 packages
Raw silk                                        3,300 kuamme (206 piculs)
Lead (Japanese)                             800 piculs
Iron                                                     31,500 bundles
Leaf tobacco                                         9,250 bundles
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Cut tobacco                                       13,760 boxes
Mats (fi ne)                                       15,000 packages
Mats (rough)                                     105,000 packages
（Kuamme: kanme）
Th e small number of items—a mere 20—shows how incomplete the return was. While 
the governor had noted some omissions (such as sake, a major item in coastal trade), what is 
more striking is the total absence of cloth. Th e fi gure for rice is higher than in earlier trade 
returns, suggesting that it included kuramai 蔵米 (rice on domain or daimyo account, normally 
not included in trade fi gures of Osaka). Th e relatively modest total in the wake of the bad 
harvest of 1865, which would depress the overall level of trade in rice in 1866, is consistent also 
with the low number of ships entering the port in the course of 1866. 
Appendix 3: Problems in BPP Figures for Nagasaki and Yokohama, 1863
Up to mid decade a recurrence of problems in one or other port was a feature of statistical 
reporting, but in two cases, Nagasaki (1862 and more particularly 1863) and Yokohama (1863), 
fi gures present an uncommon degree of confusion.
A. Nagasaki Trade Figures for 1863
                  Nagasaki Trade in 1863
BPP*
(in dollars)
Paske-Smith†
(in dollars)
Japanese return ◦
(in taels)
exports 1,388,071
(925,381)
 
925,000 3,470,182
imports 1,421,885
(947,458)
602,000 3,552,967
* Figures from BPP, vol. 4, p. 121; fi gures in parentheses from BPP, vol. 4, pp. 205–206 (adding totals for 
British and foreign vessels). Figures of 1,388,071 dollars and 1,421,885 dollars, diff ering from those given in 
his table on p. 303 are also cited elsewhere by Paske-Smith 1930, p. 206.
† Table from Paske-Smith 1930, Appendix 1, p. 303.
◦ Returns in taels, from BPP, vol. 4. pp. 143–47; conversion of taels to dollars at variable rates.
Import fi gures of 947,458 dollars and export fi gures of 925,381 and the variant export 
fi gure of 1,388,071 dollars and import fi gure of 1,421,885 dollars seem to be a consequence 
of confusion caused by diff erent rates of conversion from taels to dollars. Returns in taels by 
defi nition originated with Japanese offi  cials rather than in a consular attempt at counting. 
Th e conversion rate of 5.85 taels to the dollar given by Paske-Smith for the trade of 1863 is 
erroneous. It is suspiciously close to the fi xed rate of 5.90 taels that was used for valuing invoices 
in gold currencies (while the market rate had sunk to 3.370 in 1863). Th e tael was an archaic 
measure used in the international trade of east Asia, and was going out of fashion in Nagasaki. 
In 1865, and for some years thereafter, fi gures in Nagasaki were valued in ichibus, an actual 
coin and not an archaic method of valuing in a notional money of account. Th e amounts in 
ichibus were then converted into dollars at the market rate. As late as February 1863, the British 
consuls did not have independent knowledge of the conversion rate of the tael.161 In the case of 
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the calculation for 1862, the presence of both taels and dollars had already led to confusion. In 
addition to a fi xed rate for converting imports from gold currency countries, both fl uctuating 
market rates and an accelerating fall in the market value of silver were possible sources of 
confusion. If conversion is done at a high rate of 5.90 taels to the dollar, imports of 3,552,967 
taels in 1863 became 602,198 dollars. (Th is is by coincidence, or otherwise, Paske-Smith’s low 
fi gure for imports.) A total of 925,381 dollars f or exports, if a rendering of a count of 3,4 70,182 
in taels, would sugge st a tael exchange of 3.75, a fi gure quoted in 1865 as an average value of the 
tael in 1863 and 1864.162 A total of 1,388,071 dollars, on the other hand, seems unduly high 
as it implies for 1863 a rate of less than 3 taels to the dollar. Th us, the likely fi gures are 925,381 
dollars for exports (a fi gure close to that in Paske-Smith’s table), and 947,458 for imports. Th e 
higher fi gure of 1,421,885 dollars given in one BPP version requires a very low tael rate. Th e 
fi gures of 925,381 dollars for exports and of 947,458 for imports given in a table for the years 
1863–65 for all three open ports would seem to confi rm the validity of these fi gures, even 
though they may have been incorporated, perhaps with the wisdom of hindsight, into a report 
from Kanagawa on 28 March 1866.163 
B. Yokohama Trade Figures for 1863
Th e fi gures for Yokohama in 1863 presented Ishii with more problems, and he spent more 
time on them than on fi gures for any other year. Finally, he opted for a high total of 10,554,012 
dollars for exports rather than the alternative of only half that fi gure; and for imports he opted 
for 3, 244,584 dollars.164 In making this choice, he disregarded without discussion a higher 
fi gure for imports of 3,474,749 dollars that had appeared in his own Table no. 3.165 Here the 
appearance of confusion is much greater than the reality. Th e problem lay in the fact that 
for that year offi  cials presented both the “declared values,” that is the fi gures as computed 
by the Custom House, and adjusted imports on criteria of their own (adjusted to account 
for information on prices, for example). Defective valuations were the most easily identifi ed 
defi ciency in the statistics. Silk was the dominant item in the exports of Yokohama; even in 
terms of declared values, it accounted for 4,127,340 dollars, or 80 percent of total exports of 
5,134,184 dollars. In the declared or offi  cial values, silk was valued at 210 dollars per picul; in 
the appendix to the Kanagawa consul’s report it was valued at 450 dollars apiece. Nowhere is 
it stated that the fi gures had been revalued. Figures in dollars tables were declared to be at “the 
valuations accepted thereon at the Custom House,” but there was no indication in the text that 
fi gures in sterling arose from a conversion into sterling of data in the appendix for imports at 
revised valuations. Figures for exports also were adjusted.
Th e table below sets out the various estimates for the confusing data for this year.
Value of Yokohama Trade in 1863 in BPP Reports+
          Consul’s report Alternative estimate 
(appendix of consul’s report)
Exports
Imports
Dollars
5,134,184
1,595,170
Sterling
2,638,503
 811,146
 Dollars
10,554,022
 3,244,589
(Sterling) *
(2,638,505)
 (811.147)
+BPP, vol. 4, pp. 87–101, especially pp. 87, 94–95. Th is table is obviously drawn from the same source as Paske-
Smith’s account (Paske-Smith 1930, pp. 205–206).
*Actual sterling totals are not given by the Kanagawa consul in the appendix; they are as cited in the report, 
resulting from conversion of dollar totals at 5s.0d. to the dollar. 
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Th e tabular presentation above identifi es the cause of the apparent confusion in the BPP. 
Th e dollar and sterling totals in the consul’s report, viewed in the context of the report itself, 
would imply a conversion rate of 1.9 in the case of both imports and exports. Th is cannot be 
the base of conversion, as the consul was aware of a conversion rate of 5s.0d. to the dollar, 
and quoted it several times. In other words, the fi gures are independent of each other. In the 
case of the alternative estimate, the fi gures in the appendix to the report were given in a series 
of separate tables for ships of various nations that were not summed up into grand totals for 
exports and imports. If added up and converted at 5s.0d. to the dollar, the dollar total yields 
the sterling fi gures which appear in the consul’s report. Th us, while dollar totals in the report 
are the “declared values” at the Custom House, the sterling totals in the consul’s report are 
not conversions of the Custom House declared values, but conversions into sterling of higher 
gross totals in dollars created by the consular revaluation process. In the body of the consular 
report (if not in the appendix), those totals seems to be identifi ed quite erroneously as sterling 
equivalents of the declared values. In other words, there is neither a serious error in the fi gures, 
nor a gross confusion by the consul, but an apparent rather than real contradiction caused 
by the lack of an unambiguous statement of the diff erent basis on which the fi gures in the 
appendix were compiled.166 Th e lack of an actual gross total for component detail in the tables 
in the appendix made it easier not to advert to the error.
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2　 BPP, vol. 1, p. 165, Edo, 21 Nov. 1859.
3　 TNA, FO 262/230, f.103, Gower, Hyogo, 29 Feb. 1872.
4　 BPP, vol. 4, p. 29.
5　 BPP, vol. 4, p. 21.
6　 For an interesting summary of the situation, see Paske-Smith 1930, p. 203.
7　 BPP, vol. 4, pp. 19, 20. Th e Nagasaki exports for 1859 of 870,436 dollars were not cited by Ishii. 
(Ishii 1944). Th ere is also an estimate for exports from Nagasaki for the fi rst half of the year. As the port 
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8　 BPP, vol. 4, pp. 29–31. See also Paske-Smith 1930, p. 205.
9　 BPP, vol. 1, p. 194, Alcock, 6 March, 1860. In a letter of 26 April, he described it more ambiguously 
as the trade of “less than 12 months” (BPP, vol. 4, p. 18). Alcock seems to have drawn this conclusion 
primarily on the basis of the evidence he had for Nagasaki.
10　 BPP, vol. 4, 26 April 1860, pp. 20–21. Th e total was 584,262 dollars, consisting of 461,386 
dollars to Britain but including some coastal trade, and 122,876 dollars to foreign countries. Th ese 
fi gures were not cited by Ishii in his classic study (Ishii 1944), no doubt because of their nature as 
external estimates not generated in Japan itself.
11　 BPP, vol. 4, pp. 23–29, Consul Vyse, Kanagawa, undated report for half year ending 31 Dec. 1860.
12　 For an amusing but patronizing and possibly apocryphal story of the entry at a Custom House, 
apparently in Nagasaki, of two tigers, see Alcock 1863, vol. 2, pp. 385–86.
13　 Ishii 1944.
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Some of his data diff er from those in the BPP. While widely quoted, their sources have never been 
analyzed. See Appendix 1, Th e Paske-Smith fi gures for exports and imports in the open ports. 
15　 Sugiyama 1988, p. 47.
16　 Baba and Tatemoto 1968, p. 164
17　 Kawai 1895, p. 4. His fi gures were later used extensively by Itani Zen’ichi.
18　 BPP were available in later bound volumes and, in modern times, papers for Japan have been 
brought together in the Irish University Press series of 10 volumes. Parliamentary papers were fi rst 
published and circulated as individual documents, and at the time it was to these that Japanese and 
others alike had access.
19　 Ishii 1944, p. 38.
20　 From an English language text entitled “Foreign trade of Japan: a statistical survey,” and separately 
paginated (Nihon bōeki seiran, 1935, p. 16). Th is table is missing from what is otherwise a broadly 
similar Japanese-language version preceding it in the same volume.
21　 Ishii 1944, exercising due discrimination, adopted the latter fi gure in his Table no. 5.
22　 Paske-Smith did not give fi gures for Hakodate, hence his totals, which are for Kanagawa and 
Nagasaki only, cannot be compared with totals for all three open ports. Paske-Smith 1930, p. 303.
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23　 Ibid.
24　 Th ere is a still higher fi gure of 3,701,084 dollars in Yokohama shi shi 1959, p. 548.
25　 Ishii 1944, pp. 50–51.
26　 Yokohama shi shi 1959, p.548.
27　 As quoted in Ishii 1944, p.38.
28　 BPP, vol. 1, pp. 285–87, Vyse, 19 Feb. 1861. Vyse converted the totals into sterling. Th ese are the 
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at fi rst claimed was a new Deshima 出島). Th e consular station itself, refl ecting British opposition to 
the Japanese decision, continued for some considerable time to describe its reports as coming from the 
consular station at Kanagawa. 
29　 Th e alarming magnitude of the consul’s “approximate estimate” for 1862 of 2.5 million dollars for 
imports and 3 million dollars for exports was simply caused by the consul in his confusion giving too 
low a value in taels to the dollar; his conversion infl ated the dollar sum (Nagasaki consul, 18 February 
1863, BPP, vol. 4, pp. 60–67, Winchester). Th e consul, not conversant with the going exchange rates 
(BPP, vol. 4, p. 63), quoted an improbable exchange rate of 1.80 taels to the dollar for the export trade 
on the authority of the Portuguese consul. Winchester took the dollar for imports to be equal to 1 ½ 
taels (p. 61); on what authority Winchester relied, we do not know. To add to the confusion, elsewhere 
in the report the British consul quoted 3.50 to 4.00 taels as the valuation of the dollar on the open 
market (p. 61). He also gave a rate of 5.50 taels to the dollar for what seems the fi xed rate employed 
by the Custom House for converting gold invoices into dollars (p. 61). Th is was a rate both below the 
actual rate of 5.90 at the time and the conversion rate of 5.85 tael to the dollar in later years. A rate of 
5.90 taels (or 5.85) would appear to be inapplicable to exports at large (as they were in silver prices), 
and also to imports from silver currency areas. For these areas of trade, Custom House valuations of the 
dollar were probably at, or close to, market valuations. Conversion of the gross total of trade in taels 
to dollars on the basis of 5.85 or 5.90 taels to the dollar (a rate much higher than an open market rate 
around 3.50 taels), would by defi nition result in an unduly defl ated gross total in dollars. In addition, 
as the gross total consisted of imports in silver currency and of a gold currency component already 
defl ated by a high offi  cial rate for the dollar, a gross total converted at a high rate of 5,90 taels would 
include a component in eff ect defl ated twice over. Th e consular confusion over taels and dollars, which 
was not spotted in Kawai’s study, was recognized by Ishii, who used a rate of 3.75 taels to the dollar to 
calculate total exports of 800,000 dollars and total imports of 667,000 dollars.
30　 For Nagasaki, Alcock’s fi gures were exports of 1,000,317 dollars (£203,000 sterling) and imports 
of 669,261 dollars (£140,000 sterling). (Alcock, vol. 2, p. 387.) Alcock’s fi gures were higher than 
Paske-Smith’s, but the two versions are not grossly out of line. Alcock’s data for 1861 seem the more 
solid. Alcock’s fi gures for Yokohama appear in Alcock 1863, vol. 2, p. 384. His fi gures for 1861 were 
£558,948 sterling for exports and £307,981 sterling for imports. Th e fi gures were derived apparently 
from dollar totals converted at 4s.2d. to the dollar. His fi gures for 1860 (exports of £823,812 sterling 
and imports of £197,023 sterling) are identical to Vyse’s (see note 28), if allowance is made for some 
rounding by Vyse. Th e pagination of Alcock’s book, as given in Ishii, is from the American edition.
31　 His sources are identifi ed in note 3, referring to p. 43 as Shokanjō sono hoka jūkomi 諸勘定其
外絨込.
32　 Th e source is identifi ed in foot note no. 4, referring to page 43, as Kakkoku shokandome man‘en 
gannen 各国書翰留万延元年.
33　 Referring to p. 44 of the text, footnote 6 gives as its authority Isen sho kakitsuke 異船諸書
付, and footnote 9 (p. 58) gives for authority Nezu Masashi 禰津正志, “Bunkyū gannen Rokan 
Posadoniggu no Tsushima senkyo ni tsuite” 文久元年露艦ポサドニッグの対馬占拠に就いて, Hō 
to keizai 法と経済 2:2. 
34　 Footnote 18 (p. 58) referring to text on page 46 is based on “Burenwarudo hōkoku” ブレンワ
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ルド報告, cited in a paper by Itani (Itani 1931). Th e author and work are identifi ed from Ishii, p. 42, 
footnote 8.
35　 While Paske-Smith’s table has rounded fi gures for 1859 and 1860, it entirely lacks 1862 data for 
Nagasaki. It also has the curiosity of returns for Yokohama for 1866, which do not feature in offi  cial 
consular reports. Almost certainly these fi gures are an aggregation of monthly fi gures for the fi rst ten 
months of 1866, although it is an open question whether the monthly returns existed in the Custom 
House at the time, or came into consular possession at a later date. Strikingly, Paske-Smith refers to a 
source other than the printed reports in the parliamentary papers, though for 1863 his evidence seems 
to suggest that he had access to the printed report on the trade of that year. On Paske-Smith’s sources, 
see Appendix 1: Th e Paske-Smith fi gures for exports and imports in the open ports.
36　 BPP, vol. 4, p. 142, 3 Jan. 1865, Gower, forwarding return for 1863. Gower seems to have had 
some diffi  culty with statistics at large, and his inadequacy became more apparent in his service in 
Osaka in the early 1870s.
37　 BPP, vol. 4, pp. 48–49, 31 Jan. 1863. Ishii’s text appears to give Alcock’s fi gures in taels for the 
year, with the dollar total coming from a conversion of the tael total into dollars. However, it is clear 
that the consular report was Ishii’s source, though he omits to mention the BPP. A retrospective table 
for 1860–1864 appears in the report for 1864, dated 24 March 1865 (BPP, vol. 4, p. 105).
38　 BPP, vol. 4, pp. 94–95, March 1864.
39　 Th e 1863 report does not seem to have been formally presented to London, and was not printed 
in BPP. Th e fi gures for 1863 can be gleaned only obliquely: in retrospect from fi gures in taels for that 
year which are given alongside the fi gures for 1864 in the 1864 report made early in the following 
year, and in dollars in tables comparing the trade of the three open ports. Th ese numbers appear in 
Kanagawa reports on 21 April 1865 and 28 April 1866 (See appendix B). Th e report for Nagasaki for 
1865, dated 15 Jan. 1866 (BPP, vol. 4, p. 186) referred to a double report for 1863 and 1864. Th is was 
not literally the case; rather there was an interval of fi fteen days between the two reports (3 Jan. 1865 
and 18 Jan. 1865). Th e temporal separation of the reports explains why the very late report for 1863 
was in eff ect suppressed, and only the report for 1864 entered into the offi  cial domain.
40　 BPP, vol. 4, pp. 37–38, 41–44. Th is was picked up by Kawai Toshiyasu and thence entered by 
Ishii in his Table no. 5. No fi gure is given for imports for 1862, which could be either an omission or 
simply a case of the minute quantity of imports not being considered worth reporting.
41　 BPP, vol. 4, pp. 77–86.
42　 BPP, vol. 4, pp. 153–168, 1 Jan. 1865; BPP, vol. 4, pp. 174–84, 1 Jan. 1866.
43　 Cullen 2009, pp.192, 210.
44　 BPP, vol. 4, p. 494–500, Parkes, Edo, 31 March 1870. Th e report included not only totals 
of foreign trade, but slso the amount of trade in foreign goods between Japanese ports. Th e report 
observed (p. 494) that, as some of the foreign trade was intended for transshipment, an addition of 
the data on foreign trade and local trade would entail double counting. Th e following report for 1870 
appeared under the date of 21 April 1871. BPP, vol. 4, pp. 637–42.
45　 Hakodate exports for 1863 are given variously as 269,050 dollars (BPP, vol. 4, p. 80); 266,134 
(BPP, vol. 4, p. 167); 167,025 (BPP, vol. 4, pp. 205–206); and 148,712 (BPP, vol. 4, p. 121). Th ere 
are Nagasaki exports and imports for 1864 of 1,159,892 dollars and 1,316,897 dollars in BPP, vol. 
4, p. 188, and exports of 1,739,838 dollars and imports of 975,435 dollars for the same year in BPP, 
vol. 4, p. 121.
46　 Ishii opted for the Paske-Smith fi gure for imports.
47　 Yokohama shi shi, 1959, p. 548.
48　 Foreign trade returns, 1866–1880 YKS, vol. 9, Jan. 1873.
49　 Yokohama shi shi: Shiryō hen, 1962, Hanrei.
50　 Signifi cantly or otherwise, perhaps because the compiler detected the confusion in the report on 
1863 and sought to avoid its messy implications, a retrospective table of exports from Yokohama for 
1860–1872 “for such of the preceding years as the consulate records furnish me with” gave no data for 
1863. (BPP, vol. 5, p. 141, 31 March 1873.) Consular compilers of fi gures who scrupulously based 
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53　 Frost 1970, p. 31.
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59　 BPP, vol. 4, p. 326, Consul Fletcher to Parkes, Kanagawa, 31 May 1868.
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要旨
徳川期沿岸交易および幕末・明治初期海外貿易の統計
Part 2: 幕末・明治初期における貿易
ルイ・Ｍ・カレン
　幕末から明治 15 年にいたる日本の貿易に関する資料評価が、この
二部構成の論文の主たるテーマである（Part 1 は Japan Review 21 に掲
載された）。1859 年の開港以降の統計類は、貿易の納品書などを幕
府の官吏が直接収集したものである。それ以前は、官吏たちは沿岸
交易の組合や問屋などによって提供された数字に依拠していた。閉
鎖的な金本位制度における円金貨や円銀貨の平価は、新しい開港場
における外国貿易のための標準的な通貨単位であるメキシコ・ドル
の市場公開に伴い 1871 年に崩壊した。金が流出し日本の通貨制度が
事実上銀本位制となって初めて、ドル（あるいは円銀貨）から円金
貨への換算が単一為替レートに近づいた。明治初期の日本の官吏た
ちは、不安定な通貨制度の中でドルと金の交換に生じる総計の食い
違いにもかかわらず、西洋的な統計の構築を試みうまく処理したと
も考えられる。徳川初期の沿岸交易に関する記録類は写本としてし
か残っていないが、それらは数も少なく、原本と食い違っている場
合もある。同じことが 1860 年代の海外貿易においても言える。1869
年以降の新政府による指導下でも、未完成なメモのような僅かな写
しが新しい通貨流通量の総額として知られるにすぎない（両に関し
ては 1869 年以降、円に関しては 1871 年以降）。基本的なドル総額は
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個々の税関から中央当局に送られ、その鍵となる基礎データは 1880
年代までのドルと円金貨との換算に基づいたもので、英国議事堂文
書（BPP）においてしか知られていない。
